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EXPERIENCE AND EXPERIMENT IN THE LEGAL CONTROL OF
COMPETITION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
ROBERT STEVENSit
NOVEMBER 3, 1958, was a memorable day in twentieth century English legal
history. In the Royal Courts of Justice in London in a court customarily
occupied by Her Majesty's Judges sat a collection of prominent men from
various walks of life comprising the newly-constituted Restrictive Practices
Court. Two of these men were English High Court Judges and one was a
member of the Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session, but even they
sat informally, without the customary judicial paraphernalia of robes and wigs.
With them sat two industrialists, an accountant, and a trade union official.
They held unlawful a long-standing arrangement among the manufacturers
of proprietary medicines which prevented such goods from being sold through
any retail outlet other than a pharmacy.
A few months later, this same court struck down a price-fixing arrangement
in the declining Cotton Spinning Industry. After marathon legal arguments,
the court, although it agreed that its decision might close many mills and
throw about 20,000 employees out of work, nevertheless held that the agree-
ment was against the public interest. For the first time for many years in
England, a legal decision on a civil question was headline news in the news-
papers. In the succeeding months other equally important decisions were
handed down. Price-fixing in carpets and blankets, bread and flour, chocolate
and cars, all fell under the censure of the court. Market sharing and discrimi-
natory discounts met a similar fate. Even the noncompetitive nature of the
Cooperative Societies, to which almost a quarter of the families in England
belong, was challenged.
When contrasted with the more mundane questions with which the English
courts are normally faced these decisions can only be described as startling.
The Restrictive Trade Practice Act of 1956, the source of these decisions,
marked an important change of policy. For the first time in many centuries
the United Kingdom had a law designed to strengthen competition. Restric-
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tive trade practices were required to be registered with the government, and
then submitted to the Restrictive Practices Court to determine whether they
were in the public interest. Further sections endeavored to effect a compromise
between the conflicting views about resale price maintnance, and to maintain
machinery to investigate the activities of monopolists and oligopolists.
THE BREAK WITH TRADITION
The Restrictive Trade Practices Act is unlikely to strike the American
reader as revolutionary; yet such was its appearance in England. Building
on an act passed in 1948, the 1956 legislation marked a vital change not only
in legal attitude to competition, but even towards the role of law itself. In
the era between the beginning of the First World War and the end of the
Second, the English had lost their faith in competition, and the courts had
finally expressed their inability or unwillingness to decide issues concerning
the control of the economy.
The loss of faith in competition
In 1914 the United Kingdom had probably the most competitive economy
of any of the industrial countries of the world.' In some industries there had
been largely unsuccessful attempts by competitors to make agreements with
their rivals, 2 and in others attempts to establish monopolies.3 The free trade
economy, however, gave no tariff shelter to the inefficient manufacturer or
monopolist, and since industry was distracted by the potential of the apparent-
ly inexhaustible export market, England was left with an economy largely
regulated by the functioning of the market in the classical economic tradition. 4
During the 1914-18 War this competitive structure changed considerably.
The export trade was badly injured, and imports ceased to be a stimulus to
competition. The Government found it expedient to deal with large companies,
or through trade associations representing a group of companies. This latter
form of cooperation became so common that the Federation of British Indus-
tries was established in 1917 to coordinate activities of these associations and
by 1919 their influence, which was generally anticompetitive, was felt in al-
most every industry.5 Even so it is possible that the economy might have re-
turned to a fairly competitive state after the War had the world reverted at
once to its pre-War economic pattern. As it was, however, protectionism and
isolationism became the order of the day, encouraged by economic problems
which culminated in the Great Depression.
1. Allen, Monopoly and Competition in the United Kingdom, in MONOPOLY AND COM-
PE'rIrON AND THEIR REGULATION 88, 99 (Chamberlin ed. 1954).
2. Ibid. (e.g., textile finishing, sewing thread).
3. Ibid.; see Cook, The Cement Industry, in EFFECTS OF MERGERS 21 (Cook ed. 1958)
(cement) ; Cohen, The Soap Industry, in EFFECTS OF MERGERS 215 (Cook ed. 1958) (soap);
3 CLAPHAm, AN ECONOmiC HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN 215 (1938) (salt).
4. Allen, supra note 1, at 88.
5. CO1 NUTrrTE ON TRUSTS, CUD, No, 9236 (1919).
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In the early 1920's the Government showed concern about the disappearance
of competition ;6 for during that decade the trade associations grew in strength,7
and mergers gave control to monopolists in some industries,8 while in many
new industries there seemed to be room for only one firm. 9 But in the 30's the
situation of the British economy was such that the most important thing was
to keep it moving at all. Trade associations attempted to rationalize industries
by devising plans to divide orders between companies, and the government
itself offered financial incentives to reduce production. 10
The Second World War completed the process of eliminating competition.
The wartime Government preferred to negotiate with industries through trade
associations," and by 1945 seventy five per cent of the production of all manu-
facturing industries was covered by one of these organizations. 12 There was
even a suggestion that after the war they should be made legally responsible
for operating a quota system of production in their industries.' 3 In almost
every industry, there was either a monopolist or restrictively-minded trade
association. Public opinion, which had once felt strongly enough about anti-
competitive behavior to be responsible for the break-up of at least two trusts,
14
was now silent. Radical movements in the United Kingdom had apparently
given up any thought of controlling the market behavior of corporations in
favor of the more drastic solution of nationalization. The government had
come to regard its function as keeping industry alive rather than vigorous.
Meanwhile, the business community itself had grown accustomed to working
6. See COMMITTEE ON TRUSTS, CMD. No. 9236 (1919); BALFOUR REPORT (1929);
COiMITTEE ON RESTRAINT OF TRADE (1931). See generally WILBERFORCE, CAM'rPBELL &
ELLES, THE LAW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES §§ 150-53 (1957).
7. In 1917, there had been 62 with 350 members; in 1918, 129 with 704 members; in
1925, 195 with 2100 members. Leyland, Trade Associations, in THE BRITISH ECONOMY
1945-1950, 87, 88 (Worswick and Ady ed. 1952).
8. In the early part of the decade Spillers Milling and Associated Industries was
formed to become the giant in the grain milling industry. 1926 saw the birth of I.C.I., the
giant in the chemical industry. See Allen, supra note 1, at 90.
9. For instance, Courtauld in rayon, and Lucas in electrical equipment for automobiles.
See ibid.
10. E.g., Coal Mines Act, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 34; Cotton Spinning Industry Act,
1936, 26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c. 21. The Government also encouraged the formation of the
Iron and Steel Federation in 1935 to stabilize that industry. See Burn, Steel, in 1 STRUC-
TURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 260, 296 (Burn ed. 1958).
11. Hall, Monopoly Policy, in THE BRITIsH EcONoMY 1945-1950, 399, 405 (Worswick
and Ady ed. 1952).
12. See Leyland, supra note 7, at 88.
13. Allen, supra note 1, at 103.
14. The Salt Trust, when it was formed in 1888, was violently attacked in the press,
and this no doubt encouraged its demise. See 3 CLAPHAm, AN EcoNomic HISTORY OF
MODERN BRITAIN 215 (1938)..
When the ambitious head of Lever Brothers attempted to put his company at the head
of a soap trust in 1906, the popular press and particularly the Daily Mail began a violent
attack on the scheme, so that it had to be abandoned. See Cohen, supra note 3, at 222.
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with government, 6 as well as with other members of the same industry. The
executive class had been absorbed into the Establishment," and so lost many
of the urges which might have encouraged the dynamic behavior which is al-
leged to characterize the American business community.'
As far as the English common law was concerned in the hundred years
leading up to 1945, there was not only a loss of faith in competition, but also
a general reluctance to become involved in analysis of issues concerning the
public interest, and specifically with cases which required a judgment on the
benefits of competition. 9
In the eighteenth century the judiciary, inspired by such men as Lord
Mansfield, had been conscious of its creative role, and had not hesitated to
decide cases involving problems relating to the economy. But in the space of
a few decades in the late nineteenth century the situation altered radically.20
The judges, reared on the works of Blackstone, began rigorously to deny that
they had any creative role in society ;21 yet at the same time they were inject-
16. See Crosland, The Private and Public Corporation in Great Britain, in THE COR-
PORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 260, 263 (Mason ed. 1959).
17. See Sanderson, The Confidence Trick, in THE ESTABLISHMENT (Thomas ed.
1959); ERicxsoN, BRITrSH INDUSTRIALISTS: STEEL AND HOSIERY 1850-1950, 33 (1959);
NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 475-76 (1960).
18. "A typical British Director probably still feels there is something ungentlemanly
and vulgar about too much competition." FOREIGN TRADE CONFERENCES, STAFF MEMORAN-
DUM OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, PURsuANT TO S. RES. 61, 84TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1955). See also
DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOICS AND LAW ch. 19 (1959).
For an English acceptance of this view, see The Gospel of Work, 155 ECONOMIST 957
(1948) ; Condition of Wealth, 161 ECONOMIST 605 (1951) ; Government Without Enter-
prise, 165 ECONOMIST 358 (1952) ; The Riddle of Prosperity, 168 ECON MIST 79 (1953);
Enterprise in the Air, 170 ECONOMIST 482 (1954) ; Operation Manufacture, 185 ECONOMIST
1026 (1957).
For an analysis of the attitude of American businessmen towards competition see SUT-
TON, HARRIS, KAYSEN & TOBIN, THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CRErD 162 (1956) ; KAYSEN &
TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY; AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 89 (1959). For more
popular expositions, see RANDALL, A CREED FOR FRm ENTERPRISE 19 (1952); PATON,
SHiRTsILEvE ECONOMICs 178-80 (1952). For a more skeptical view of the picture, see
ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM ch. 9 (1937) ; MILLS, WHITE COLLAR ch. 3 (1951).
19. The American common law in these years showed no such reluctance. Whatever
may in fact have been the position, the federal judges interpreting the antitrust laws have
assumed that the State courts before 1890 did refuse to enforce contracts in restraint of
trade, at least where they were nonancillary. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (Taft, J.) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1 (1911) (White, C.J.).
20. For a survey of the law up to Victorian times, see Letwin, The English Common
Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 355 (1954); WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL
& ELLES, THE LAW OF RESTRiCTVE TRADE PRAcTIcES AND MONOPOLIES §§ 201-83 (1957).
21. Note especially Lord Campbell in Beemish v. Beemish, 9 H.L. Cas. 274, 338 (1861),
since that would arrogate to the courts the power of legislating vested in Parliament; and
Lord Halsbury in London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council, [1898] A.C.
375, 380-it would involve the country in the "disastrous inconvenience" of uncertainty in
the law.
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ing into the cases their own policy view that there should be a minimum
amount of governmental interference in public affairs.22 There was therefore
not only a judicial retreat from questions relating to the running of govern-
ment,23 but also in matters concerning the control of competition in the econ-
omy.
The latter traditionally came up in two contexts, in conspiracy cases, and
in contract actions where one of the parties alleged a restraint of trade.2 4 It
was reasonably easy for the courts to distinguish their earlier decisions in con-
spiracy cases. This was mainly accomplished in the celebrated case of Mogul
Steamship Co. v. McGregor Gow & Co. decided in 1891.25 There the efforts
by a nonmember of a shipping price ring to break into the market had been
met by a concerted system of discriminatory prices to drive him out of the
business. He endeavored to claim damages, but met with judicial hostility at
each stage of the case; the defendants being held only to be exercising their
lawful rights.26 From this time onward, the tort of conspiracy has only been
allowed where the defendants have not had as their "real and preponderant
purpose" the "advancing of their own lawful business interests,"2 7 an excep-
tion so wide that it has insured that there has been no successful conspiracy
action involving business in recent years.2s
22. See Parry, Economic Theories in English Case Law, 47 L.Q. REv. 183 (1931);
Kahn-Freund, Labour Law, in LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE 2 0TH
CENTURY 215 (Ginsberg ed. 1959) (specific discussion on retreat of the judiciary from the
field of labor law).
23. The judiciary was reluctant to become embroiled in questions of constitutional
and administrative law. E.g., Local Government Board v. Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120.
24. For general discussions of the common law both as to conspiracy and restraint of
trade see: HASLAm, THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE COMBINATIONS (1931), HEDGES, THE
LAW RELATING TO RESTRAINT OF TRADE (1932), GARE, THE LAW RELATING TO COVENANTS
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE (1935), DLX, THE LAW RELATING TO CoMPErIIvE TRADING
(1938), WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL & ELLES, THE LAW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
AND MONOPOLIES § 201-92 (1957).
Note also the following articles, Simpson, How Far Does the Law of England Forbid
Monopoly?, 41 L.Q. REv. 393 (1925) ; Eastwood, Trade Protection and Monopoly, 3 CUR-
RENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 100 (1950) ; Grunfeld & Yamey, United Kingdom, in ANTI-TRUST
LAWS; A CoMPARATIVE SYmPoSium 540 (Friedmann ed. 1956).
25. [1892] A.C. 25.
26. See per Lord Coleridge, CJ., 21 Q.B.D. 544, 552 (1888); per Bowen, L.J., 23
Q.B.D. 598, 611 (C.A. 1889) ; per Lord Halsbury, L.C., [1892] A.C. 25, 38 (1891).
27. The tort was expounded in "the famous trilogy," Allen v. Flood, [1898] A.C. 1;
Quinn v. Leatham, [1901] A.C. 495 (Ir.) ; Sorrell v. Smith, [1925] A.C. 700. For an
analytical exposition of these cases, see STREET, THE LAW OF TORTS 353-57 (2d ed. 1959).
The most recent leading case is Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co. v. Veitch, [1942]
A.C. 435. See also Freidmann, The Harris Tweed Case and Freedom of Trade, 6 MODERN
L. REv. 1 (1942) ; Lewis, Monopoly and the Law: An Economist's Reflection on the Crof-
ter Case, 6 MODERN L. REv. 97 (1943).
28. Cf. the American common law. The idea of "lawful business interest" as a justi-
fication was limited. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N.E. 1077 (1896); Plant v.
Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900). Successful conspiracy actions have not been
uncommon, even in situations similar to the Mogul case. See successful actions against
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In the area of contractual restraint of trade, however, it was not so easy for
the judges to escape from the problems of competition. 9 The courts had tradi-
tionally concerned themselves with pleas of "restraint of trade" in cases con-
cerning contracts of service and sales of businesses. At first, all contracts found
to be in restraint of trade were held to be illegal; from the early part of the
eighteenth century, however, only those in general restraint were struck down.
But in 1894 in Nordenfeld v. Nordenfeld Guns & Ammunition Co.31 the
view was expressed that the true test should be one of reasonableness, and
this was soon accepted as the law. 2 In propounding this test of reasonable-
ness Lord MacNaughten had said that the restraint should not only be rea-
sonable between the parties, but also should be reasonable with reference to
the interests of the public. 3 This second requirement might have given the
judges an opportunity to take an active role in shaping the competitive nature
of the economy. In fact, they behaved in much the same way as they had to-
wards the tort of conspiracy; and by equating the public interest with reason-
ableness between the parties to the contract, they avoided deciding questions
about the public interest in competition.3 4
They were thus able to uphold as in the public interest a price ring among
hop producers when one of the members tried to cut prices,3 5 a market shar-
ing agreement in the salt industry,3 6 bid rigging at auctions,3T and even a ty-
collective boycotts by a price-cutting retail pharmacist, Klingel's Pharmacy v. Sharp &
Dohme, 104 Md. 218, 64 Atl. 1029 (1906), and a coal trader, Hawarden v. Youghiogheny
& L. Coal Co., 111 Wis. 545, 87 N.W. 472 (1901).
29. The American judges did not make any effort to escape. For a comment on the
strength of the doctrine at common law. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469,
497 (1940) (Stone, J.). For an interesting comparison of English common law and the
laws of the several States in this area see Peppin, Price-Fixing Agreements Under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law, (pts. 1-2), 28 CAIF. L. REv. 297, 667 (1940).
30. Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Ch. 1711).
31. [1894] A.C. 535.
32. Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 A.C. 688.
33. [1894] A.C. 535, 565.
34. See Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v. Adelaide S.S. Co.,
[1913] A.C. 781, 795 (P.C. Aust.) (Lord Parker).
Although in McEllistrim v. Ballymacelligott Co-operative Agricultural & Dairy Soc'y,
Ltd., [1919] A.C. 548, 563 (Ir.), Lord Birkenhead L.C. said that it would not be "difficult
to conceive of a case in which a contract in restraint of trade might be adjusted to safe-
guard the reasonable interests of the contracting parties, and yet might be opposed to the
public interest," this has happened in only two cases, both dealing with contracts of ser-
vice: Wyatt v. Kreglinger & Fernau, 11933] 1 K.B. 793 (C.A.) (agreement to pay retire-
ment pension to clerk) ; Kores Mfg. Co. v. Kolok Mfg. Co., [1959] Ch. 108 (C.A.) (agree-
ment between corporations not to hire one another's former employees). On two occasions
trade association cases have been held to be unreasonable between the parties. See McEllis-
trim v. Ballymacelligott, supra, and Evans & Co. v. Heathcote, [1918] 1 K.B. 418 (trade
association quota case; restrictive arrangement enforced on other grounds).
35. See English Hop Growers Ltd. v. Dering, [1928] 2 K.B. 174 (C.A.).
36. North Western Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co., [1914] A.C. 461.
37. Rawlings v. General Trading Co., [1921] 1 K.B. 635 (C.A.).
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ing arrangement whereby a bus company was forced to buy its requirements
of petrol in perpetuity from the vendor of a piece of land.8 The maintenance
of monopolies by the leasing of machines was upheld even to the extent of an
injunction indirectly compelling the use of the leased machines. 39 One court
even held that letters written by a notorious monopoly inducing its customers
not to trade with a potential competitor were original literary works within
the meaning of the copyright laws, and enjoined efforts to publicize them. 40
Resale price maintenance agreements were enforced without a qualm,41 even
if the plaintiff had given up the policy of fair trading for other retailers, 4 2 and
apparently even if, after an initial fair trade contract, the defendant began to
buy his supplies elsewhere.43 It was also regarded as contrary to public policy
to help break a "fair trade" scheme. 44 At times there were problems about
privity of contract 45 or the genuineness of liquidated damages, 46 but these
were overcome by a system of black lists and private courts, schemes which
ultimately received the blessing of the House of Lords. 4 7
The judiciary justified its refusal to entertain trade conspiracy cases or to
discuss the competitive implications of restraint of trade cases on the ground
that the courts were not equipped to decide economic questions.48 This
rationalization probably masked two main predispositions in the minds of the
38. Foley v. Classique Coaches, [1934] 2 K.B. 1 (C.A.).
39. British United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Somervell, 95 L.T. 711 (K.B. 1907); United
Shoe Mach. Co. v. Brunet, [1909] A.C. 330 (P.C. Can.).
40. British Oxygen Co. v. Liquid Air, Ltd., [1925] 1 Ch. 383; see MONOPOLIES &
REsTRIcTIvE PRACTICES COmm'N, THE SUPPLY OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIAL AND MEDICAL
CASES (1956) (a description of the activities of B.O.C. in these years).
41. Elliman Sons v. Carrington & Son, [1901] 2 Ch. 275.
42. Livock v. Pearson Bros., 33 Comm. Cas. 188 (K.B. 1928).
43. Palmolive Co. v. Freidman, [1928] 1 Ch. 246 (C.A. 1927); see Comment, 44 L.Q.
REv. 278 (1928); cf. Comment, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 1006 (1928).
44. Berg v. Sadler & Moore, [1937] 2 K.B. 158 (C.A.).
45. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co., [1915] A.C. 847.
46. E.g., Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. New Garage Motor Co., [1915] A.C. 79.
47. Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass'n, [1937] A.C. 797.
48. When faced with a monopoly which exploited its power by the use of tie-ins, the
Privy Council declared that "the evil, if it exists, may be capable of cure by legislation or
competition, but in their view not by litigation." United Shoe Machinery Co. of Canada v.
Brunet, [1909] A.C. 330, 344 (P.C. Que.).
The Mogul case also reflected this view. See per Fry, L.J., 23 Q.B.D. 625 (C.A. 1889);
per Lord Morris, [1892] A.C. 25, 50.
The great apologist of the Common Law was forced to concede that "our lady the
common law is not a professed economist." POLLOCK, THE GENIUS OF THE COMMON LAW
94 (1911). The judicial view is rationalized id. at 108:
[Jiudges ought to be very careful about committing themselves to fashionable eco-
nomic theories: first, because they are quite likely to misunderstand or misapply
such theories, secondly because the theory may well be discredited after a short
time, and, thirdly because, when mistakes of this kind are once made, they are pretty
sure to call for legislation, and the legislative amendment is almost sure to be un-
satisfactory.
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judges; that there should be a minimum amount of judicial interference with
the economy,49 and that competition was not a particularly desirable end.P0
Sitting as members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, they were
merciless in making nonsense of pro-competitive legislation passed in Austral-
ia 51 and New Zealand.5 In striking down one of the Australian Industries
Preservation Acts, which closely followed the provisions of the Sherman
Act,5 3 the views of the English judges on the question of competition became
clear:
[I]t was proved that the prices prevailing when negotiations for this
agreement commenced were disastrously low owing to the "cut-throat"
competition which had prevailed for some years. . . . It can never, in
their Lordships' opinion, be of real benefit to the consumers of coal that
colliery proprietors should carry on their business at a loss, or that any
profit they make should depend on the miners' wages being reduced to a
minimum. Where these conditions prevail, the less remunerative collieries
will be closed down, there will be great loss of capital, miners will be
thro.,n out of employment, less coal will be produced, and prices will
consequently rise until it becomes possible to reopen the closed collieries
or open other seams. The consumers of coal will lose in the long run if
the colliery proprietors do not make fair profits or the miners do not re-
ceive fair wages. There is in this respect a solidarity of interest between
all members of the public.54
A judiciary with such views was unlikely to prove an effective bulwark against
the anticompetitive sentiments of the business community.
The Slow Change of Heart
Whereas in 1914 the British economy had ranked among the most competi-
tive in the world, in 1945 it ranked among the least competitive.55 But by that
time it had already passed through the worst part of its anticompetitive phase.
A Government White Paper in 1944 r6 had said that something would have
to be done about restrictive practices in industry when the war was over, and
49. Again illustrated by the Mogul case, see Lord Watson, [1892] A.C. 25, 43.
50. See North Western Salt Co. v. Electrolytic Alkali Co., [1914] A.C. 461, 469 (Lord
Haldane) ; note 54 infra.
For economists' views of the judicial treatment of competition, see Cooke, Legal Rule
and Economic Function, 46 EcoN. J. 21 (1936) ; Hunter, Competition and the Law, 27
MANCHESTER ScHOOL 52 (1959).
51. Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia v. Adelaide S.S. Co., [1913]
A.C. 781 (P.C. Aust.).
52. Crown Milling Co. v. The King, [1927] A.C. 394 (P.C., N.Z.).
53. The Australian Industries Preservation Act, 1906, No. 9 of 1906.
54. [1913] A.C. at 809-10.
55. The stagnant and inefficient state of British Industry at the end of the War was
the cause of much comment. See, e.g., Rothbarth, Causes of the Superior Efficiency, of
U.S.A. Industry as Compared with British Industry, 56 EcoN. J. 383 (1946) ; YELVERTON
& TERBOROUGH, TECHNOLOGICAL STAGNATION IN GREAT BRITAIN (1947); BowEN, BRT-
AIN'S INDUSTRIAL SURVIVAL (1947).
56. Employment Policy, CUD. No. 6527, para. 41 (1944).
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it was rumored in 1945 that the Coalition Government would have introduced
legislation then had it not been for the pressure of big business.57 The victory
of the Labour Party in the election that year, committed as it was to a policy
of nationalization, was regarded by some as a blow to the idea of a more com-
petitive economy.5s This proved wrong, for nationalization took time, and in
the interim the party elected to attack the restrictions in the private sector of
the economy.59
It was not long before the Labour government found itself face to face with
the problems presented by restrictive practices in important industries. Per-
haps the most vital problem of domestic politics in these years was the build-
ing of houses, which was largely under government sponsorship. Contact with
the price ring in cement soon led to a departmental investigation, 0 and the
results of this survey were sufficiently alarming to cause a committee to be
set up to investigate building materials as a whole; this produced an equally
alarming report.01 Restrictive practices also came in for unfavorable comments
when the government-sponsored Working Parties, representing both manage-
ment and labor, investigated various industries and made detrimental com-
parisons between their operation in the United Kingdom and the United
States. 2
The Government therefore decided to implement the suggestion in the 1944
White Paper. Early in 1948 it introduced a bill, the central feature of which
was the establishment of an independent tribunal,0 3 known as the Monopolies
57. See Plant, Monopolies and Restrictive Practices, 10 LLOYD'S BANK R~vIEW 1, 3
(1948).
58. On the relationship between the 1945 election and monopoly problem, see Morgan,
Britain's Election: A Debate on Nationalization and Cartels, 61 PoL. ScI. Q. 222 (1946).
59. See Lxwis, MONOPOLY IN BRITISH INDUSTRY 1 (Fabian Research Series No. 91,
1945).
60. MINISTRY OF WORKS, CoMtIRE ON CEMENT COSTS (1946); see The Cement
Bottleneck, 152 ECONOMIST 816 (1947); Cement Monopoly: Acquittal, 152 ECONOMIST
861 (1947).
61. MINISTRY OF WORKS, REPORT OF THE C !MITTEE OF ENQUIRY INTO THE DisTRi-
RUTION OF BUILDING MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS (1948) ; see The Builders' Merchant,
154 EcONOIsT 722 (1948); The Builders' Merchant Replies, 154 ECONOMIST 775, 851
(1948).
There was also a government investigation into the production of textile machinery.
See Spotlight on Cotton Machinery, 152 ECONOMIST 862 (1947).
62. For a full list of these, see WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL & Eu-zs, REsTRicTIvE TRADE
PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES 46 (1957). The International Trade Organization Charter,
signed in March 1948 and dealing inter alia with restrictive practices, also probably in-
fluenced the government. See GUENATLT & JACKSON, THE CONTROL OF MONOPOLY IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM 37 (1960).
63. The Commission was intended to be an Administrative tribunal. See Speech of
Shepherd, 452 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 2159 (1948); JOINT COMMITTEE OF THE LABOUR
PARTY AND THE TRADE UNION CONGRESS ON TRUSTS AND CARTELS, THE PUBLIC CONTROL
or MONOPOLY 2 (1947).
There was no effort to follow the procedure of a court of law, or at least the common
law concept of the adversary procedure. Section 8 allowed the Commission to decide its
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and Restrictive Practices Commission, to investigate restrictive business prac-
tices. 64 To this body specific industries 65 or generalized restrictive practices Oil
might be referred by the Board of Trade. The primary task of the Commission
was to investigate the industry 67 or practice and to determine whether the
behavior revealed was in the public interest.68 The Board of Trade had to lay
any report of the Commission before Parliament,69 and then interested Gov-
ernment Departments were entitled to declare illegal by delegated legislation
any or all of the restrictive practices found by the Commission to be contrary
to the public interest.70 The bill caused almost no controversy and stirred little
interest, 71 the main support coming from a few enthusiasts on both sides of
the House.72
own procedure, and specifically conferred the right to decide who should be entitled to be
heard; and also gave extensive subpoena powers.
64. Now the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Enquiry & Control) Act, 1948,
11-13 Geo. 6, c. 66, § 1 sets up the Commission.
65. Industries might be referred by the Board of Trade either at its own discretion or
as a result of complaints received. 11-13 Geo. 6, c. 66, §§ 2, 16(3) ; see 449 H.C. DES. (5th
Ser.) 2029 (1948). Before any industry reference could be made it had to be shown that
at least one third of the supply, processing or export of goods in that industry was con-
trolled by or from a group of corporately related firms or firms which worked together to
prevent or restrict competition. 11-13 Geo. 6, c. 66, §§ 3, 4, 5.
66. 11-13 Geo. 6, c. 66, § 15.
67. The normal industry reference was coupled with a request for recommendations.
11-13 Geo. 6, c. 66, §§ 2, 7. But it might be limited to a fact-finding inquiry. 11-13 Geo. 6,
c. 66, § 6.
68. What amounted to public interest caused controversy, but ultimately a definition
was included at the third reading. 11-13 Geo. 6, c. 66, § 14.
69. 11-13 Geo. 6, c. 66, § 9. But there was a wide reservation of withholding if the
Board of Trade felt publication of the report would not be in the public interest, § 9(a), or
where publication of trade secrets might do harm to the firms concerned, § 9(b).
'70. 11-13 Geo. 6, c. 66, § 10. Section 11 provided for the enforcement of the orders;
§ 12 for investigations to ensure that the recommendations of the Commission were being
complied with.
71. The chief clash came when a group of right-wing conservatives sought to include
trade unions and the nationalized industries within the Act. See Speech of Osborne, 449
H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 2101 (1948) ; Speech of Lyttelton, 449 H.C. DEs. (5th ser.) 2114
(1948). The Government's reply appears in the Speech of Morrison, 449 H.C. DES. (5th
ser.) 2126 (1948).
72. The idea of some such attack had the support of the Conservative Party even be-
fore the Bill was introduced. See-speech of W. S. Churchill, reported 153 EcoNoMIST 475
(1947). Indeed the opposition spokesman had produced a pamphlet recommending a solu-
tion similar to that proposed by the Labour Government in the bill. See MAXWELL-FYFE,
MoNoPoLY (1948). See also discussion of Conservative Party's proposals in The Times
(Lbndon) Apr. 1, 1948, p. 2.
The lack of interest caused surprise. See Speech of Maxwell-Fyfe, 452 H.C. DEs. (5th
ser.) 2160-61 (1948). See also Speech of Macpherson, 452 H.C. DE. (5th ser.) 2151
(1948) ; Manchester Guardian, Apr. 2, 1948, p. 4, cols. 1-2.
There was also little interest outside Parliament, although The Economist thought the
Act had not gone far enough. Offensive Against Monopoly, 154 ECONOM IST 574 (1948) ;
Monopolies Commission, 156 EcoNomIsT 95 (1949). From the American viewpoint it was
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The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission 7 3 made twenty re-
ports on specific industries, 74 and a general report on collective discrimina-
tion 7r before it underwent a major alteration as the result of legislation in
1956. The individual industries surveyed varied in their structure; but each
was controlled by a trade association or a monopoly. In many, entry was con-
trolled by the use of approved lists, and in almost every industry there were
price-fixing and exclusive dealing agreements, frequently supported by a host
of other restrictions. 76 In no industry was anything resembling classical com-
petition found.77 The industries concerned were not altogether happy to be
awakened from their slumber and questioned about competition; and they
were full of arguments about why the restrictions were absolutely necessary,
and why competition in their industry would be against the public interest.78
suggested that the act was a sinister design on the part of the Labour Party to take over
British Industry. Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 899 (1950).
73. On the working of the Commission, see GUENAULT & JAcicsON, THE CONTROL OF
MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (1960) ; WILBERFORCE, op. cit. supra note 62, ch. 3,
4, 8; Grunfeld & Yamey, United Kingdom, in ANTI-TRUST LAws (Friedman ed. 1956);
Clay, The Campaign Against Monopoly and Restrictive Practices, 24 LLOYDS BANK RE-
VIEW 14, 25-29 (1952); Kilroy, Tasks and Methods of the Monopolies Commission, 22
MANCHESTER SCHOOL (1953) ; Harbury & Raskind, The British Approach to Monopoly
Control, 67 Q.J. ECoN. 380 (1953); Hunter, The Monopolies Commission and Economic
Welfare, 23 MANCHESTER SCHOOL 22 (1954) ; Hunter, The Monopolies Commission and
Price Fixing, 66 ECON. J. 587 (1956) ; Jewkes, British Monopoly Policy 1944-55, 1 J. LAW
AND ECON. 1 (1958) ; Cairns, Monopolies and Restrictive Practices, in LAW AND OPINION
IN ENGLAND IN TEE 20TH CENTURY (Ginsberg ed. 1959).
74. Report on the Supply of Dental Goods Dec. 1, 1950; Report on the Supply of Cast
Iron Rainwater Goods March 14, 1951; Report on the Supply of Electric Lamps Oct. 4,
1951; Report on the Supply of Insulated Electric Wire and Cables June 10, 1952; Report
on the Supply of Itsulin Oct. 14, 1952; Report on the Supply and Export of Matches and
the Supply of Match-Making Machinery May 12, 1953; Report on the Supply of Imported
Timber Oct. 20, 1953; Report on the Supply of Buildings in the Greater London Area
July 29, 1954; Report on the Supply and Export of certain Semi-Manufactures of Copper
and Copper-Based Alloys July 27, 1955; Report on the Supply and Export of Pneumatic
Tyres Dec. 8, 1955; Report on the Supply of Sand and Gravel in Central Scotland March
22, 1956; Report on the Supply of Hard Fibre Cordage June 7, 1956; Report on the Supply
of Certain Rubber Footwear July 30, 1956; Report on the Supply of Linoleum Aug. 2,
1956; Report on the Supply of Certain Industrial and Medical Gases Dec. 20, 1956; Report
on the Supply of Standard Metal Windows and Doors Dec. 20, 1956; Report on the Supply
of Electronic Valves and Cathode Ray Tubes Dec. 20, 1956; Report of the Supply of Tea
Dec. 20, 1956; Report on the Supply and Exports of Electrical and Allied Machinery and
Plant Feb. 21, 1957.
75. Report on Collective Discrimination, CMD. No. 9504 (1955).
Another general reference was made to the Commission on Common Prices and Col-
lective Tendering, Oct. 29, 1955. The Reference lapsed in 1956. Monopolies Inquiries
Shelved, 179 ECONOMIST 65 (1956).
76. See GUENAULT & JACKSON, Op. cit. supra note 73, ch. 6; Jewkes, supra note 73.
77. Cf. 2 THE STRUCTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 429 (Burn ed. 1958). The only in-
dustries with some remote semblance of "perfect" competition found by this study were
wool, textiles, cutlery, and some parts of cotton and pottery.
78. Among other things competition was alleged to debase quality and service (Copper
Report paras. 264-65) ; and to interfere with modernization and research (Calico Printing
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The Commission, however, proved to be attracted to the idea of competition;
of the twenty reports, only three found the agreements in the industry to be
in the public interest.79
Almost as soon as the 1948 Act was passed, there were those who felt that
a stronger law was needed.80 In 1949 the Lloyd Jacob Committee on Resale
Price Maintenance, which had been set up in 1947, recommended that all
forms of collective resale price maintenance be made illegal. 81 In June of 1950
a White Paper announced that the Labour Government intended to introduce
a bill to implement the Lloyd Jacob Report, and to limit the power of manu-
facturers in individual resale price maintenance to the naming of the maximum
prices which might be charged.8 2
In the Autumn of 1951 a General Election was held, in which the Conser-
vatives were returned. Although the party's election manifesto had talked of
stronger measures to control monopolies and restrictive practices,8 3 for a while
the official policy became softer toward business.84 The Labour Government's
bill to abolish resale price maintenance was dropped; and the Board of Trade
adopted the practice of negotiating with industries about the restrictions found
contrary to the public interest in the Commission's Reports, in place of its
earlier policy of declaring such practices illegal by delegated legislation.8" But
there was a growing feeling of uneasiness about restrictive practices, the slow-
ness of the Commission's operations 6 and the anticompetitive behavior
revealed when reports finally emerged.8 7 This ultimately resulted in the
Report paras. 175, 180). Among its alleged advantages were that it kept up capacity in
bad times (Electrical Machinery Report para. 756); and acted as a short cut to perfect
competition (Tyre Report, para 451).
79. The Insulin, Tea, and Metal Windows Reports, supra note 74.
80. Teeth and Monopoly, 159 EcoNoMIST 1132 (1950); Quiet Life for Monopolies,
160 EcONOMIST 475 (1951).
81. Report of the Committee on Resale Price Maintenance, CMO. No. 7696 (1949).
See WILBERFORCE, op. cit. supra note 20, ch. 9.
82. A Statement on Resale Price Maintenance, CMD. No. 8274 (1951).
83. Monopolies and Motives, 161 EcoNoMIsT 495 (1951); No Signposts, 161 EcONO-
M TIS 777 (1951) ; Creation of Wealth, 161 EcoNoMIsT 605 (1951).
See also The Manifesto of the Conservative and Unionist Party, 1951, p. 5.
84. The Programme, 161 EcONOMIST 1016, 1021 (1951); see Mere Beginning, 161
EcoNofmisT 1085 (1951) ; Manchester Guardian, May 20, 1952, p. 6, col. 2.
85. See The Monopoly and Restrictive Practices (Dental Goods) Order, 1951. S.I. 1951
No. 1200; False Teeth, 160 ECONOMIST 677 (1951).
86. See Motion on Monopolies Practices in House of Commons, June 15, 1951, 488
H.C. DE B. (5th ser.) 2689 (1951); Speech of Dalton, reported in 164 ECONOMIST 247
(1952).
In Parliament it was estimated that at the rate industries were being investigated it
would take 2400 years to survey the whole of British Industry. Speech of Crosland, 488
H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 2692 (1951). Another economist estimated that 8000 years would be
needed. Hall, Monopoly Policy, in Tna BRITISH ECONOMY 1945-1950, 399, 413 (Wors-
wick & Ady ed. 1952).
87. See especially the reaction to the Electric Lamp Report. Manchester Guardian,
Nov. 14, 1951, p. 6, cols. 1-2; The Times, (London), Nov. 14, 1951, p. 10 (editorial).
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Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act of 1953,88 which pro-
vided for an increase in the size of the Commission, and enabled it to sit in
divisions.
Even this proved but a temporary measure, however, for dissatisfaction
with the working of the Commission did not disappear. Some members of
the public were skeptical about the efficacy of the process of negotiating with
industries,89 and looked for a more rigorous policy.90 For other reasons, in-
dustry itself was unhappy. Individual industries objected to being singled out
for investigation, and resented the inquisitorial nature of the Commission's
proceedings and the subsequent pressures for enforcement by the Board of
Trade."'
The final blow, however, came neither from liberal opinion nor from in-
dustry, but from the Collective Discrimination Report, published shortly after
the Conservatives had been returned again in the General Election of 1955.
This found an infinite variety of restrictive and discriminatory practices going
on over a wide area of British Industry, and concluded that these were gen-
erally contrary to the public interest. The majority of the Commission felt
that all such practices should be made illegal, with provision for certain ex-
ceptions where the public interest might be in favor of retaining them; the
minority preferred a system of registration and investigation.9 2 Then, as if to
confirm the need for a change, the Board of Trade conveniently published the
Tyre Report. This caught the public imagination because of the flagrant nature
of the restrictive practices; and the press called on the Government to act as
88. 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 51.
89. The most notorious example of the failure of the negotiating process is shown by
the imported timber industry. After the Report on the Supply of Imported Timber (1953)
the industry agreed to drop many of its practices. Timber and Monopoly, 169 EcONOmIST
352 (1953). But a 1958 report by the Monopolies Commission, Imported Timber: Report
on whether and to what extent the Recommendation of the Commission has been complied
with, showed that despite the undertaking after the first report, most of the restrictions
were still in effect. An Order To Compete?, 188 EcoNOIST 872 (1958). Two years later
the Board of Trade at last made the practices illegal, but without any willingness. The
Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Order, S.I. 1960, No. 1211 (imported hardwood and
softwood timber). The President of the Board of Trade explained that there had been a
"misunderstanding on the part of the members of the industry." HUTBER, WANTED--A
MONOPOLY Poucy 11 (1960).
90. Many people were also unhappy with an arrangement whereby it was left to the
Government to decide which recommendations of the Commission would be accepted, and
how they would be enforced. See.generally Jewkes, supra note 73; Manchester Guardian,
May 20, 1952, p. 6, col. 2; Monopoly Inquiries Shelved, 179 ECONomiST 65 (1956).
91. See the clash between the Cable Industry and the Board bf Trade. Implementing
Monopoly Reports, 171 EcoNoMIsT 734 (1954) ; A Cable Maker's Reply, 171 EcONoMIST
1000 (1954); MONOPOLIES AND REsTRICTIV PRacTIcES ACTs, 1948 AND 1953, BOARD OF
TRADE ANNUAL REPORT para. 20 (1954).
92. Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Report on Collective Discrimi-
nation, CAD. No. 9504, paras. 249-50 (1955).
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soon as possible. 93 It was to the accompaniment of such pressures 04 that Mr.
Thorneycroft, as President of the Board of Trade, introduced the Restrictive
Trade Practices Bill in February of 1956.93
This bill contained two primary provisions, registration and investigation.
The idea of registering restrictive agreements met with general approval on
both sides of the House. In sharp contrast to this, the proposal for a Restric-
tive Practices Court to investigate the registered agreements led to violent
disagreement, both at the second reading and at the committee stage. Although
the Government spokesmen placed great faith in the judicial solution, 0 the
idea of a court of law for investigating restrictive practices, even when tem-
pered by the presence of laymen, was unacceptable to many, and became the
center of Labour's hostility to the bill. Opposition members argued that ques-
tions of policy were involved, and that these were the responsibility of the
Government 97 and Parliament 9 8 and should not be shuffled off on to the
courts.99 There was concern about the danger of forcing judges to decide what
were thought to be essentially political and economic issues, which a former
Solicitor-General alleged to be the "antithesis of law."' 0 This concern was
93. Communist: The Great Rubber Robbery, Daily Worker, Dec. 10, 1955, p. 1;
Labour: Tyre Price Ring Condemned, Daily Herald, Dec. 10, 1955, p. 1; Desist, ibid.;
Snooper with a Dirty Face, id. at 3; Liberal: Indictment of an Industry, News Chronicle,
Dec. 10, 1955, p. 4; Conservative: Tyre Prices and Practices, Daily Telegraph, Dec. 10,
1955, p. 6.
94. Some commentators thought the measure outlined was a capitulation to big busi-
ness; but others realized that the proposal was a fundamental change of policy. Bolder
Than They Think, 176 EcoNoMIsT 204 (1955). Industry, which had hoped for a soft
measure, was unhappy. See True Blue Incorruptible, 175 EcONOMIsT 1154 (1955) ; Rings
on the Run?, 176 EcoNomIsT 105 (1955) ; Restrictions and the Unregenerate, 177 EcoNo-
MIST 372 (1955).
95. Which became the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68. For
the bill as originally drafted, see Public Bills 1955-56, No. 239.
96. See Speech of Thorneycroft, on March 6, 1956, 549 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 1934
(1956). See also Speeches of Kilmuir, June 26, 1956, 198 H.L. DFn. (5th ser.) 18 (1956),
July 26, 1956, 199 H.L. DEB. (5th ser.) 350 (1956).
97. Speech of Jay, on March 6, 1956, 549 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 1951 (1956) ; Speech
of Castle, on March 6, 1956, id. at 2002.
98. Speech of Darling, on March 6, 1956, id. at 1991.
100. See Speech of Ungoed-Thomas on March 6, 1956, id. at 2029.
The function of a court is not that which is mentioned in the Bill; it is entirely
different, namely, to interpret and administer law, and not to make it. The Bill hands
over to this court governmental and parliamentary power. All judgments are founded
upon law or upon facts, but in this case the decision which really matters will be a
decision founded neither upon law nor upon fact. It will be a political and economic
decision.
The true place of public interest in law is as the foundation and reason for a
general rule, which the law then applies. It is not for a judge to conceive what, in
all the circumstances, he considers the public interest to be. That is not law; it is
the negation of law.
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supported by quotations from the judges themselves expressing the opinion
that they were not equipped to make such politico-economic decisions ;01 and
even Mr. Thorneycroft and Viscount Kilmuir, the Government Spokesmen,
conceded that their plan had novel aspects. But despite the existence of these
pressures the English system of party discipline ensured the passage of the
bill.102
THE RESTRICTiVE TRADE PRAcricEs Act, 1956
The Major Provisions
The first object of the 1956 Act 103 is to ensure disclosure of restrictive
business practices. Part I creates the post of Registrar of Restrictive Trading
Agreements, and delegates to him the task of keeping the Registers in which
all restrictive agreements must be recorded. 0 4 As is the English tradition, the
act defines in great detail that conduct which will be construed as registrable.
In general the act calls for registration of all agreements relating to the pro-
duction, processing, supply, or acquisition of goods which contain restrictions
affecting prices, terms or conditions concerning output, persons, or places. At
least two of the parties to the agreement must accept some restriction. Un-
101. Speech of Turner-Samuels, on March 6, 1956, id. at 2023, quoting Lord Bowen
and Fry, L.J.
102. A Bouquet for Mr. Thorneycroft, 179 ECONOMIST 248 (1956).
103. 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68.
See generally: HAILSHAM & McEWEN, THE LAW RELATING TO MONOPOLIES, RESTRIc-
TIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (1956) ; HEATucOTE-WILLIAMS,
BERNSTEIN & ROBERTS, THE LAW OF RESTRICTIvE TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES
(1956); ALBER" & FLETCHER-COOKE, MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
(1956); WILBERFORCE, CAMPBELL & ELLES, THE LAW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES
AND MONOPOLIES (1957); MARTIN, RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES
(1957) ; JoHNSON-DAviEs & HARRINGTON, RESTRICTIvE TRADE PRACTICES (1957).
See also: Solo & Heuss, New Competition in the Old World, 2 ANTI-TRUST BULLETIN
41 (1956); Symposium, How Should We Control Monopoly?, 66 EcoNoMIc JOUR. 567
(1956) ; Keyes, Anti-Trust at last in Britain: The Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956,
25 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 627 (1957) ; Morrison, The Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 11 IN-
DUS. L. REv. 168 (1957) ; Grunfeld, Antitrust Law in Britain Since the Act of 1956, 6 Am.
J. CoMp. L. 439 (1957); Martin, The New British Antitrust Law, 13 Bus. LAW 272
(1958) ; Dennison, The British Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1956, 2 JOUR. OF L. AND
EcON. 64 (1959) ; Heath, The 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act: Price Agreements
and the Public Interest, 27 MANCHESTER SCHOOL 72 (1959) ; Hunter, Competition and the
Law, 27 MANCHESTER SCHOOL 52 (1959); Korah, The Restrictive Practices Court, 12
C.L.P. 76 (1959) ; Rhinelander, The British Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 46 VA. L.
REv. 1 (1960). Yamey, Restrictive Agreements and the Public Interest, [1960] PUBLIC
LAW 152; Wiseman, Lloyd, Heath, Symposium on Restrictive Practice Legislation, 70
EcoN. J. 455 (1960); Rostow, British and American Experience with Legislation Against
Restraints on Competition, 23 MODERN L. REv. 477 (1960) ; Sich, Current Legislation in
the United Kingdom dealing with Restrictive Business Agreements, PROCEEDINGS, INTER-
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CONTROl, QF REsTRTCTIVE BvSINEss PRCTIcEs (Wallis ed,
1960).
104, The Act, § 1,
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enforceable arrangements of this nature must also be registered, 05 as must
recommendations of trade associations designed to achieve similar ends.100
Certain industries where the government has established some form of ration-
alization 10 7 and some types of agreement such as supply and requirements
contracts 108 are, however, totally excluded.
The process of registration has proved a less complicated procedure than
had been expected.10 9 Only on one occasion"n 0 was it necessary to call on the
High Court to act in its capacity as arbiter of registrability,"' although the
Restrictive Practices Court has twice declared itself without jurisdiction be-
cause it found the agreements at stake to be outside the scope of the act."
2
Considerable use seems to have been made by the Registrar of his power to
invite registration of an agreement which he suspects exists,1' 3 but there is no
evidence that he has had to resort to the High Court to examine an oath," 4
or that anyone has been convicted of the crime of failing to register an agree-
ment after being invited to do so by the Registrar." 5 After agreements have
been registered, the Registrar is entitled to refer them to the Restrictive Prac-
tices Court,"i0 although in fact he has regarded himself as under a duty to
refer all such agreements.
The court is in every sense a court of law, although in addition to Judges
from the High Court of the three jurisdictions in the United Kingdom " 7 it
also has lay judges, being persons "qualified by virtue of [their] knowledge
or of experience in industry, commerce or public affairs." ' s The court may
105. The Act, §§ 6(1)-(3).
106. The Act, §§ 6(6)-(8).
107. E.g., The Act, § 8(2).
108. Supply contracts, § 7(2) ; requirements contracts, § 8(3). See also § 8(8) (for-
eign trade) ; § 8(4) (patents) ; § 7(4) (workmen).
109. See Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements, Report for the period 7th
August, 1956 to 31st December 1959, Caixo. No. 1273, ch. 1 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Report of the Registrar (1961)1.
110. In re Austin Motor Co.'s Agreements L.R. 1 R.P. 6 (Ch. 1957).
111. The Act, § 13(2).
112. In re Blanket Mfrs.' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 208 (1959), aff'd, L.R. 1 R.P. 271
(C.A. 1959) (an agreement between manufacturers not to allow any order to be cancelled);
see Ison, Restrictive Trade Practices-The Danger Sign, 23 MODERN L. REv. 202 (1960);
In re Doncaster and Retford Cooperative Societies' Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 105 (1960)
(agreement not to accept members from the other's area).
113. The Act, § 14. By December 1959, some 250 agreements had been caught in this
way. Report of the Registrar (1960), para. 26.
114. The Act, § 15.
115. The Act, § 16. For such an offence a £ 100 fine is provided. False statements may
lead to a term of imprisonment of up to 2 years; and refusal to register after a conviction
is punishable by a sliding scale of fees.
116. The Act, §§ 1(2), 17.
117. The Act, § 3. The High Court in England; the Court of Session in Scotland;
and the Supreme Court in Northern Ireland.
118. The Act, § 4. Such appointments are customarily to be made for three years, with
eligibility for reappointment "Other members" may be dismissed by the Lord Chancellor
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sit in divisions, with a minimum of three members, presided over by one of
the High Court Judges,119 who alone decides purely legal questions. 20 He
also must deliver the final judgment of the majority, and he may therefore
find himself dissenting from the opinion which he reads, but neither he nor
any member of the court is allowed to express a dissent.1 2 1 Appeals are
allowed to the ordinary courts of appeal of the jurisdictions where the court
is sitting, but on questions of law only; and as usual, the House of Lords acts
as the final appeal court for the whole United Kingdom. 22
Although most of the agreements required to be registered would be found
illegal per se under American antitrust law, the United Kingdom Act only
presumes they are contrary to the public interest and so illegal. To rebut this
presumption the parties to the agreement must persuade the Restrictive Prac-
tices Court that the agreement passes two tests. The first requires the court
to be satisfied that the agreement comes within at least one of seven "gate-
ways" set out in the act. Two of these are concerned primarily with pur-
chasers of goods, the one allowing the agreement if it is necessary to protect
the public from injury,' = the other if its removal would deny a section of the
public 124 a specific and substantial benefit.'2 5 The next two gateways allow
restrictions where the structure of the industry reasonably demands them,
namely where the agreement is designed to meet anticompetitive measures
taken by another member or other members of the industry, 12 6 or where mo-
nopoly conditions among the suppliers or monopsony conditions among the
buyers reasonably require such an arrangement. 27 The three final gateways
allow the agreement to be upheld if its removal might be likely to cause
serious unemployment in any area ' 28 or might reasonably be expected to make
a serious inroad into the export business, 2 9 or where it is reasonably neces-
sary to support an agreement already found to be in the public interest.18 0
"for inability or misbehaviour, or on the ground of any employment or interest which
appears to the Lord Chancellor incompatible with the functions of a member of the Court."
Section 4(2) (b).
119. The Act, Schedule to the Act, § 4.
120. The Act, Schedule, § 5.
121. The Act, Schedule, §§ 3, 4, 5. This rule was justified on the ground that a judge
would not wish to sit in a court with which he found himself constantly at variance. See
Speech of Walker-Smith, 552 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 2313 (1956).
122. The Act, Schedule § 7.
123. The Act, § 21(1)(a).
124. The definition of "public" in this gateway has caused some conflict. In Yarn
Spinners, it was assumed without deciding that it meant the community as a whole. L.R.
1 R.P. 118, 190 (1959). But in Black Bolt and Nut, it was interpreted as referring to any
section of the public, viz. as purchasers, or consumers, or users. Moreover, in the case of
purchasers, it was limited to immediate purchasers. L.R. 2 R.P. 50, 93-94 (1960).
125. The Act, § 21(1)(b).
126. The Act, § 21(1)(c).
127. The Act, § 21(l)(d).
128. The Act, § 21(1)(e).
129. The Act, § 21(1)(f).
130. The Act, § 21(1)(g).
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But bringing an agreement within one of these seven gateways only satisfies
the first test. The court has to be further convinced that, balancing the satis-
faction of one or more gateways against any detriment which might be suffered
by society as a whole, the agreement is not unreasonable. 31 Only when both
these tests have been completely satisfied are the parties entitled to a declara-
tion that their agreement is not contrary to the public interest.
In its first two and a half years the Restrictive Practices Court has decided
twelve fully litigated cases.' 3 2 The first test was satisfied by only five of the
twenty restrictive agreements referred to the court in these twelve cases, and
only four were found to be in the public interest after the final balancing
process. In only two cases has the main agreement been upheld. In about
sixty other cases the parties to agreements have submitted to judgment. 33
131. The Act, § 21(1).
[A]nd is further satisfied (in any such case) that the restriction is not unreason-
able having regard to the balance between those circumstances any any detriment to
the public or to persons not parties to the agreement (being purchasers, consumers
or users of goods produced or sold by such parties, or persons engaged or seeking
to become engaged in the trade or business of selling such goods or of producing or
selling similar goods) resulting or likely to result from the operation of the restric-
tion.
This naturally caused the most interest and conflict; since it was here that policy con-
siderations were most clearly delegated to the court for solution. See Speech of Ungoed-
Thomas, 552 H.C. DaB. (5th ser.) 726 (1956), "What the Amendment does, quite clearly,
is to make it impossible for the Court to avoid the political economic decision which is in-
volved in balancing the economic advantages and disadvantages." The new tailpiece was,
however, incorporated into the act. Id. at 730.
132. it re Chemist's Fed'n Agreement (No. 2), L.R. 1 R.P. 75 (1958), [19581 3 All
E.R. 448; In re Yarn Spinners Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959), [1959] 1 All E.R. 299.
In re Blanket Mfrs.' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 208 (1959), [1959] 2 All E.R. 1, aff'd, L.R.
1 R.P. 271 (C.A. 1959), [1959] 2 All E.R. 630; In re Scottish Ass'n of Bakers' Agree-
ment, L.R. 1 R.P. 347 (1959), [1959] 3 All E.R. 98; In re Water-Tube Boilermakers'
Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 285 (1959), [1959] 3 All E.R. 257; In re Fed'n of Bakers' (Great
Britain and Northern Ireland) Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 387 (1959), [1960] 1 All E.R. 227;
In re Fed'n of British Carpet Mfrs.' Agreement, L.R. 1 R.P. 472 (1959), [1960] 1 All
E.R. 356; In re Phenol Producers' Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 1 (1960), [1960] 2 All E.R.
128; In re Black Bolt & Nut Ass'n's Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 50 (1960), [1960] 3 All E.R.
122; In re Doncaster & Retford Co-op. Soc'ys Agreement, L.R. 2 R.P. 105 (1960), [1960]
3 All E.R. 541; In re Wholesale Confectioners' Alliance's Agreement, [1960] 1 W.L.R.
1417, [1961] 1 All E.R. 116; In re Motor Vehicles Distribution Scheme Agreement, [1961]
1 W.L.R. 92 (1960), [1961] 1 All E.R. 161.
133. For a list of the twenty-five groups of agreements submitted to judgment up to
December 31, 1959, see Report of the Registrar (1961), Appendix C. For some of the
cases submitted since that date, see In re Master Process Engravers Agreement, The
Times (London), Feb. 2, 1960, p. 15; In re Zinc Oxide Fed'n's Agreement, The Times
(London), Apr. 27, 1960, p. 17; In re Association of Paving and Kerb Mfrs.' Agreement,
ibid.; In re Electric Light Fittings Ass'n's Agreement, ibid.; In re Metal Bedsteads' Ass'n's
Agreement, ibid.; In re Agreement of British Bath Mfrs. Association, The Times (Lon-
don), July 5, 196, p. 19; In re United Kingdom Glycerine Producers Ass'n's Agreement,
The Times (London), July 5, 1960, p. 19; In re Association of Hard Fiber Rope Mfrs.'
Agreement, The Times (London), July 5, 1960, p. 19; In re Association of Steel Drum
Mfrs' Agreement, The Times (London), Oct. 5, 1960, p. 7.
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The court has been stern in its interpretation of the public interest in price
fixing cases. All types of price rings among manufacturers and wholesalers,
34
including collective "fair trade,"'"3 have been struck down. The favorite at-
tempted justification has been public benefit; and it has been alleged that
such price-fixing agreements confer economic benefits because they stabilize
prices,1 30 avoid cut-throat competition, 37 keep small producers in business
thereby avoiding monopoly,1 38 and preserve capacity in bad times to cope with
demand in good. 139 Other defenses have included the arguments that price-
fixing cuts advertising and promotional costs,140 encourages modernization, 41
leads to good relations and confidence in the industry,'1  and to improved
quality and service.' 43 But only in Black Bolt and Nut did the Court accept
such an agreement as conferring a public benefit, apparently on the reasoning
that the advantage of not having to "go shopping" was a specific and sub-
stantial benefit to the public-defined as the buyers of black bolts and nuts-
particularly since the prices charged were reasonable and no higher than they
would have been if there had been active competition.
The court has been equally hostile when the other gateways have been
pleaded in support of price-fixing agreements. Arguments in favor of bring-
ing such restrictions within the public safety ' 44 and export'145 gateways have
been rejected; although the unemployment gateway was accepted as a primary
justification for the price-fixing agreement in the Yarn Spinners case. But con-
sidering the overall approach, it is not surprising that the majority of cases
where parties have submitted to judgment have involved a price-fixing
scheme.
14 6
134. Blanket Mfrs.', L.R. 1 R.P. 208 (1959) (minimum); Scottish Bakers', L.R. 1
R.P. 347 (1959) (fixed); English Bakers', L.R. 1 R.P. 387 (1959) (maximum); Carpet
Mfrs.', L.R. 1 R.P. 472 (1959) (fixed); Phenol Producers', L.R. 2 R.P. 1 (1960) (fixed);
Wholesale Confectioners', [1960] 1 W.L.R. 1917 (fixed).
135. Motor Vehicles, [ 1961] 1 W.L.R. 92.
136. Yarn Spinners, L.R. 1 R.P. 118, 188 (1959); Scottish Bakers, L.R. 1 R.P. 347,
374-77 (1959) ; Carpet Mfrs., L.R. 1 R.P. 472, 540-41 (1960) ; Phenol Producers, L.R. 2
R.P. 1, 42-48 (1960).
137. Yarn Spinners, L.R. 1 R.P. 118, 182-84 (1959).
138. Id. at 188; Scottish Bakers, L.R. 1 R.P. 347, 382-83 (1959).
139. Yarn Spinners, L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959) ; Phenol Producers, L.R. 2 R.P. 1 (1960).
140. Carpet Mfrs., L.R. 1 R.P. 472, 542-43 (1960).
141. Yarn Spinners, L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959); Blanket Mfrs., L.R. 1 R.P. 271, 253
(1959).
142. Id. at 254; Scottish Bakers, L.R. 1 R.P. 347, 385 (1959), Wholesale Confectioners,
[1960] 1 W.L.R. 1417, 1429.
143. Yarn Spinners, L.R. 1 R.P. 118, 188 (1959) ; Blanket Mfrs., L.R. 1 R.P. 208, 255
(1959) ; Carpet Mfrs., L.R. 1 R.P. 472, 537-38 (1960) ; Scottish Bakers, L.R. 1 R.P. 347,
384 (1959) ; Motor Vehicles, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 92, 113-15. An important argument related
to this was the provision of service in remote areas, e.g., Wholesale Confectioners, [1960]
1 W.L.R. 1417, 1426-27; Motor Vehicles, supra at 114.
144. Carpet Mfrs., supra note 143.
145. Motor Vehicles, supra note 143.
146. See supra note 133.
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In each of the three agreements which have featured market sharing, both
geographical and by bid rigging, 147 public benefit has been pleaded and re-
jected; although one was upheld under the export justification after the
monopsony gateway had been rejected.148 Three agreements involving dis-
criminatory discounts,149 and two agreements to sell only to certain persons,160
have come before the court-and each has been found to be against the public
interest; the public benefit argument being rejected in each one, and the ex-
port 151 and injury to the public 1 2 gateways rejected in different cases. In
the two cases concerning trading terms, the court upheld as conferring a pub-
lic benefit an intertrading agreement whereby one manufacturer allowed others
in the same industry discounts on goods required to fulfill orders,1 3 but found
an agreement to maintain uniform arrangements for supplying samples and
packaging orders not to be so.'5 4 The only example of an agreement to uphold
standards in an industry was found to be a clear example of public benefit.'5r
On the five occasions that agreements have been found to come within a
gateway, only once has the agreement failed to pass the second test-the
balancing process. This case 156 also represented the only occasion on which
the court has fully spelt out the way it viewed the balancing process-here
the probability that the abrogation of the agreement would have a serious and
persistent adverse effect on unemployment in eleven areas contrasted with the
Registrar's claims that the agreement was responsible for slightly higher prices
for goods, losses in the export trade and waste of the national resources by
excess capacity:
The effect on the general level of unemployment is much graver. But
whether it be in relation to the four or the eleven areas, the effect is
147. Water-Tube Boilermakers, L.R. 1 R.P. 285 (1959) (quota agreement for bid-
ding) ; Black Bolt and Nut, L.R. 2 R.P. 50 (1960) (allocation of orders for sales to gov-
ernment departments); Doncaster Co-operative, L.R. 2 R.P. 105 (1960) (geographical
boundary agreement for sales).
148. Water-Tube Boilermakers, supra note 147.
149. Carpet Mfrs., L.R. 1 R.P. 472 (1960) (special discounts to wholesalers on ap-
proved list); Black Bolt and Nut, L.R. 2 R.P. 50 (1960) (discounts to large buyers) ;
Motor Vehicles, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 92 (discounts to unfranchised dealers, repairmen who
introduced an ultimate buyer, and car fleet men).
150. Chemist's Fed'ns, L.R. 1 R.P. 75 (1958) (sales of proprietary medicines only
through chemists' shops) ; Carpet Mfrs., supra note 149 (no sales directly to the public).
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.; Motor Vehicles, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 92.
153. Black Bolt and Nut, L.R. 2 R.P. 50 (1960) (intertrading arrangement; whereby
one manufacturer allowed another in the industry a discount on goods required to fulfill
an order).
154. Blanket Mfrs., L.R. 1 R.P. 271 (C.A. 1959) (agreement concerning uniform
arrangements for samples and packaging).
155. Blanket Mfrs., supra note 154 (agreement as to quality of certain types of blan-
kets).
156. Yarn Spinners, L.R. 1 R.P. 118 (1959) (minimum price agreement found to
qualify under the unemployment gateway).
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localised; the price of its avoidance would have to be paid nationally. It
would be paid not solely or primarily in the price of cotton goods or in
the loss to export trade. Though both are substantial, we have in mind
chiefly the waste of national resources in the form of excess capacity. So
long as the scheme lasts, concentration in the industry will be postponed;
it will not be until the excess capacity has been got rid of that the indus-
try can be made into a more compact entity, a reorganisation which we
believe will ultimately be beneficial not merely to the nation and the con-
suming public, but to the industry itself and those employed in it. We
have decided that on balance it would be unreasonable to continue the
restrictions in the scheme in order to avoid the degree of local unemploy-
ment which we fear.'5 7
If an agreement fails to survive these two tests then it is declared void by
the court. It was thought from the wording of the act that the usual remedy
would be an injunction, but in fact the court has so far been willing to accept
an undertaking by the parties to the agreement that they will abandon their
agreement, in lieu of granting an injunction. 58
The Minor Provisions
The problem of Resale Price Maintenance has been regarded as a three-fold
one, covering collective agreements to have such a policy, collective arrange-
ments for its enforcement, and individual resale price maintenance itself. 59
An agreement to have a policy of fair trade would fall within Part I of the
act, and be required to be registered and then submitted to the Restrictive
Practices Court; but the other two aspects of price maintenance are dealt with
by Part II of the act. Section twenty-four, the only part of the act which made
any specific behavior invariably illegal, outlaws collective enforcement of retail
157. Id. at 196 (Devlin, J.). In the other four agreements the balancing process has
not been clearly articulated, presumably because the judges regard the process as obvious.
But they may be seeking to avoid a conflict between satisfaction of a gateway as a legal test
and the final assessment of reasonableness which is largely a policy choice. See Water-Tube
Boilermakers, L.R. 1 R.P. 285, 346 (1959) (market sharing agreement) ; Blanket Mfrs.,
L.R. 1 R.P. 208, 257 (1959) (minimum substance agreement); Black Bolt and Nut, L.R.
2 R.P. 50 (1960) (price agreement; and conditions of sale agreement).
In the Chemist's Fed'n, Devlin, J. said that even if the defendants had satisfied gate-
ways (a) and (b), they would clearly have failed in the balancing process. L.R. 1 R.P.
75, 107 (1958) (sales of proprietary medicines only through chemists' shops).
158. The Act, § 20. See discussion by Devlin, J. in Chemist's Fed'n, L.R. 1 R.P. 75,
112 (1958).
159. This tripartite division may be traced back to two reports, the Report of the
Committee on Resale Price Maintenance, CmiD. No. 7696 (1948), and the Monopolies and
Restrictive Practices Commission, Report on Collective Discrimination, CAD. No. 9504
(1955). The first report recommended that individual resale price maintenance be allowed,
but that anything beyond the sanctions open to an individual manufacturer should be made
illegal. The second report dealt only with collective arrangements concerning resale price
maintenance, and the distinction between collective enforcement which was basically un-
desirable, and collective agreements about resale price maintenance, which might or might
not be in the public interest.
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prices whether by boycott, discrimination, penalties, or private courts. To
compensate for this, the following section gives each individual supplier the
right to enforce his chosen retail price for any goods he supplies, not only
against those with whom he has a contract, but also against nonsigners. Only
one case has apparently been brought to prevent collective enforcement,'- °
but great use has been made of the individual right to enforce, 01 the only
serious problem being the amount of notice required to bind a nonsigner.10 2
Part III of the act provides for the continuation of the Monopolies and
Restrictive Practices Commission in an emaciated form, as the Monopolies
Commission. The power of the Commission has been cut down to the investi-
gation of industries where "monopoly conditions" prevail and where there are
no agreements registrable under Part I of the act.163 Since 1956 the new Com-
mission has delivered one report on a specific industry,' T and a special re-
port analyzing how far a report of its predecessor had been complied with.1'
Four more industries are presently under investigation.166
THE EFFECT OF THE 1956 AcT
On the Economy
Despite the decisions which the Restrictive Practices Court has been hand-
ing down, the overall effect of the act on the economy has been remarkably
160. An action by the Board of Trade against the Northern Council of the Grocers
Association after its officers had sought to coerce manufacturers with the threat of a col-
lective boycott if the manufacturers continued to deal with certain price cutters. The de-
fendants submitted to judgment. See Action Under Section 24 of Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Act, 174 BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL 217 (1958). See also Not To Discriminate, 188
EcoNomisT 397 (1958).
161. See, e.g., Austin Motor Co. v. Prince, [1956] C.L.Y. 8761; Imperial Tobacco Co.
v. Deeming, reported in 195 EcONOmIST 1238 (1960). See the numerous cases reported in
the quarterly surveys of § 25 actions in the P.A.T.A. Quarterly Record.
162. The supplier is required to make certain that there was notice of the restriction
and the defendant knew the chattel was supplied subject to it. County Labs., Ltd. v. Mindel,
Ltd., L.R. 1 R.P. 1 (Ch. 1957). But the notice need not be of the exact terms; it is
sufficient if the defendant is aware that the chattel was supplied subject to some price
restriction. Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Lancashire Batteries, Ltd., L.R. 1 R.P. 22
(C.A. 1958).
163. The Act, § 29. "Monopoly conditions" exist in an industry when one-third of its
production is controlled by one company or corporately-related companies. Section 31 pro-
vides that where restrictive agreements relate solely to exports and are therefore ex-
empted from registration with the Registrar by reason of § 8(8), they shall be registered
with the Board of Trade, which may then refer them to the Monopolies Commission.
164. Monopolies Commission, Report on the Supply of Fertilizers (1959). The Com-
mission also completed the last four reports of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission, which were published under the latter's name in late 1956 and early 1957.
. 165. Monopolies Commission, Imported Timber: Report on whether and to what ex-
tent the Recommendation of the Commission has been complied with (1958).
166. Electrical equipment for motor vehicles, cigarettes, tobacco manufacturing equip-
ment, tied garages. See The Commission and the Court, 186 EcoroMIsT 777 (1958);
Speech of Maudling (President of Board of Trade), 627 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) 184 (1960).
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small. Although it was accepted that much of British industry was affected
by restrictive practices, only some 2,300 167 agreements have appeared on the
Register. Before the act came into effect, a few industries had abandoned
them ;16s but many others had had them redrafted by counsel so that they no
longer came within the definition of registrability contained in the act. The
success of such activities was publicly demonstrated by the Austin Motor Co.
case. 10 9 A High Court Judge there held that a registrable restrictive retailing
scheme was no longer registrable after it had been redrawn as a series of
bipartite supply contracts, which are specifically exempted from the operation
of the act.
There are now about 1,270 agreements on the Register.1'70 Of the agree-
ments which have been abandoned only a handful had been held illegal by the
court, some sixty others were given up after submission to judgment, and no
doubt some were abandoned because they were very similar to agreements
struck down by the court. But many of the abandonments of restrictive agree-
ments are attributable to the practice of careful redrafting which enables the
parties to inform the Registrar that their agreements no longer come within
the terms of the registration section. Abandonments of this nature, however,
do not necessarily represent any serious change in the conduct of the indus-
try concerned. 17'
The English legal tradition with its emphasis on form has been so strong
that even where the Restrictive Practices Court has held agreements to be
contrary to the public interest the parties to them have been able to continue
167. Registrar of Restrictive Trading Practices, Press Release, Aug. 30, 1960. See
Approaching Half Way, 196 EcONOmIsT 920 (1960).
At the end of 1959, when the Register contained some 2240 agreements, they were found
to cover some 127 of the 150 industries appearing in the Standard International Trade
Classification. This may give a misleading picture, however, since in some industries the
only registered agreement concerned the distribution scheme of an individual manufacturer.
Of the 2240, nearly 1800 were between manufacturers, about 350 between wholesalers,
and some 400 between retailers. About half the agreements were local, and half covered
the whole country. About two-thirds of the agreements included a restriction covering
selling prices, another 150 buying prices. About half of the agreements included a restric-
tion as to standard terms. Area restrictions were included in 300 agreements, and boycott
and discriminatory arrangements against certain persons appeared in 300 and 275 cases
respectively. Production quotas figure in some 200 arguments. Report of the Registrar
(1961), ch. 2.
168. See 2 BURN, THE STRUCTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 450 (1958) ; A Price Ring
Breaks, 180 EcoNouisT 549 (1956).
169. Int re Austin Motor Co.'s Agreements, L.R. 1 R.P. 6 (Ch. 1957). See DEwEY,
MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAw 298 (1959); Wedderburn, Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices, 1957 CAMB. L.J. 121, 124; Casting Out the Old Adant, 185 ECONOMIST 65 (1957).
170. See note 167 supra.
171. For a typical list of agreements abandoned or rewritten, see Register of Restric-
tive Trading Agreements, 175 BOARD OF TRADE JOURNAL 731 (1958). For an analysis of
the registering, abandoning and rewriting of such agreements in a particular industry, see
Cuthbert and Black, Restrictive Practices in the Food Trades, 8 J. OF INDUis. EcON. 33
(1959).
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their activities in much the same way as before without apparently violating
the terms of their undertakings. The first decision of the Court, the Chemists
Federation case, which held illegal an agreement of manufacturers to sell
proprietary medicines only through chemists shops, was not a day old when
the individual manufacturers announced that they intended to continue their
present retailing policies.' 7 2 Similarly, the recent Motor Vehicles case which,
among other things, struck down a collective agreement on resale price main-
tenance, is unlikely to affect the industry seriously. This industry has had a
long tradition of self-imposed rationalization, 73 and spokesmen for the indus-
try have already predicted that this noncompetitive nature will remain un-
changed.'1 4 In other industries collective price-fixing schemes have been struck
down by the court only to be replaced by an equally anticompetitive system
of price leadership. In the Scottish Bakers case, a price-fixing agreement, and
in the English Bakers case, a minimum-price agreement, were held illegal. But
neither of these decisions caused any sign of competition in the price of bread,
which has continued to rise, with the British Bakers' Company acting as price
leader.175 English law, with its reluctance to infer agreement from parallel
behavior, has so far not regarded any of these activities as amounting to an
"arrangement" within the meaning of an undertaking or the registration sec-
tion.
In some of the litigated cases, of course, no effect on the economy could be
expected. After the Yarn Spinners case, the Government stepped in with a
scheme to rationalize the cotton industry before any long-term effects of the
judgment declaring the price-fixing agreement between the yarn spinners to
be illegal could be felt.' 76 The decision in the Blanket Manufacturers case
striking down an agreement not to sell below a minimum price was unlikely
to affect competition since, as the court itself found, prices were almost in-
variably well above the stop-loss point.' 7 7 In the Doncaster Co-operative case,
the court conceded that whichever way it decided, all co-operative societies
that remained members of the Co-operative Union would continue to respect
trading boundary agreements, even if specific boundary agreements were held
illegal, since overlapping and any other form of competition was contrary to
the policy of the Union. 7 8
Even in those cases where there has been a submission to judgment it is
impossible to say there has been a change of heart in the industry. Although
172.. Big Medicine Firms 'Defy Monopoly Court, News- Chronicle (London), Nov. 5,
1958, p. 3, col. 8; Restrictive Practices Court; Judgment in- the Chemist Federation Case,
181 PHAMAcEUTICAL J. 353, 357 (1958) ; Judgment Agahst the Chemists, 189 EcoNomisr
536 (1958); Chemists Wind Up, 189 EcoNomisT 1104 (1958). -
173. See JOHNSoN-DAvIEs, CONTROL I1 RzrAIL INDUSTRY (1945).
174. Auto Pricing Pact Voided in Britain, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1960, p. 35, col. 1;
The Motor Agreement Goes, 197 EcoNoMIsT 1329 (1960).
175. An Excess of Middlemen, 197 EcONOMIST 1265 (1960).
176. See note 209 infra.
177. L.R. 1 R.P. 208, 255 (1959).
178. L.R. 2 R.P. 105, 126 (1960).
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a series of agreements, with the emphasis on price fixing, covering over 95
per cent of the milling industry were given up in May 1959,179 there had been
no hint of any competition by the beginning of this year.'80 Similarly, it is still
apparently impossible for the farmer to escape from identical prices for baler
and binder twine 181 although the price-fixing agreement between all the manu-
facturers in that industry was abandoned in October 1959. 82
The act has had an effect on a few industries. The tobacco manufacturers
found themselves in a price war for the first time in thirty years after they
gave up their price-fixing arrangement.'" There have also been bouts of price
competition in food, 8 4 copper, s5 detergents, 8 6 and petrol, 8 7 some of which
may be attributable to the requirement of registration. But these are excep-
tions. The overall effect of the act on the economy has not been great, or at
least has not noticeably stimulated competition.
One of the chief reasons for this has been the continued prevalence and
great importance of trade associations. Covering great areas of British in-
dustry, they have been for the most part a force opposed to any increase in
competition despite the legal restraints imposed on their activities by the act.
In the pharmaceutical business, for instance, the Proprietary Articles Trade
Association has long been active.'88 Before 1956 it operated a collective sys-
tem of resale price maintenance, enforced by the usual weapons, including a
black list. To comply with the provisions of the act the black list was aban-
doned, and to avoid registration the constitution redrafted to exclude any
power to make recommendations to members. 89 But these changes have had
little effect on its work. The new constitution makes the Association primarily
responsible for discouraging price-cutting, and the Resale Price Maintenance
Co-ordinating Committee is authorized to track down price-cutters and finance
fair trade actions on the behalf of the members.'9 0 A similar change in letter
179. Report of the Registrar (1961), 30.
180. R. Lamb, With Teeth in it, The Times (London), Feb. 11, 1961, p. 7 (letter).
181. Ibid.
182. Report of the Registrar (1961), 32.
183. Fighting for Smokers, 183 EcONOmIST 74 (1957).
184. Prices Unmaintained, 188 EcoNomIsT 23 (1958) ; Coming Up Slowly, 189 Ecoxo-
sT 1089 (1959) ; Cut Price Competition?, 194 EcoNOM ST 289 (1960).
185. Financial Times, April 13, 1960.
186. Operation Manufacture, 185 EcONOMIST 1026 (1957).
187. Pumps and Pence, THE OBSERVER, London, July 3, 1960. The "majors" in this
industry have also been troubled by discontent among owners of tied garages. See, for
example, the advertisement, AM Aatter for the Monopolies Commission, The Times, July
25, 1960, p. 7, cols. 5-7. 93% of all garages are "tied" in England. ENNALS & CAMPBELL,
MIDDLE EAST ISSUES 13 (1961). The question has now been referred to the Monopolies
Commission. The Times (London), September 28, 1960, p. 19, cols. 4-5.
188. For its history, see YAuEY, THE EcoNomlcS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
158 (1954).
189. See especially P.A.T.A. Quarterly Record, July 1956, pp. 7, 11-15; id., Oct. 1956,
pp. 7, 10-11.
190. At the time the Act was passed the President was reported as having said that
the "P.A.T.A. will be able to carry on, with its existing membership framework and with
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rather than spirit has overtaken the Motor Trade Association as a result of
the 1956 legislation. 191
A related and important reason why the act has failed to influence the be-
havior of industry has been the growth of open-price agreements. 10 2 These
vary in detail, but normally provide that each member of an industry shall
report its prices to a central organization, which then disseminates them to
all firms in the industry. Many go much further than this, and require that
output, costs, inventories, wages and many other matters should be reported.
While such plans are not automatically restrictive because members have no
obligation to take action on the basis of the information supplied, the exchange
of such information makes for a life of quietness. 193 Many of these agreements
have sprung up in the electrical goods industry, 94 the members of which have
submitted to judgment before the Restrictive Practices Court in a number of
cases.195 Similarly, the cotton industry, 96 several of whose previous agree-
ments had been condemned by the court, now has many open-price agree-
ments. Agencies running these schemes have been careful not to make any
statement which might be mistaken for a recommendation, and counsel have
been advising that such agreements are not registrable, since they do not come
within the English legal concept of an agreement or arrangement.
On the Country at Large
Although there has been something of a change in the public attitude to-
ward restrictive practices, this attitude is still very different from the Ameri-
the necessary adjustments, the beneficial work it has conducted since its inception sixty
years ago." P.A.T.A. Quarterly Record, July 1956, p. 7.
In 1959, for instance, some 988 visits and 893 test purchases were made and 342 letters
written on the behalf of members. Id., Jan. 1960, p. 10. The figures for 1960 were 1000
visits, 600 test purchases and 252 letters. Id., Jan. 1961, p. 10.
As a result of these services, the number of members has increased. Id., Apr. 1957, p. 7;
id., Jan. 1958. Presidents of the Association have declared themselves delighted with the
new act, which has helped to stamp out that "rapacious weed"--the price-cutter. Id., Jan.
1957, p. 10.
191. For a history of the Motor Trade Association, see JOHNSoN-DAviws, CONTROL
IN RETAIL INDUSTRY (1945). In 1956, the black list and system of private courts were
abandoned, but the general restrictive marketing structure of the industry was maintained,
although only one agreement was registered. More Competition or Less?, 186 ECONOMIST
683 (1958).
192. See Heath, Symposium on Restrictive Practices Legislation: Some Economic
Consequences, 70 EcoN. J. 474 (1960); Korah, Open Price Agreements, 27 SOL. 202
(1960) ; Restrictions Off the Register, 195 EcONOMiST 267 (1960).
193. See Heath, sipra note 192.
194. See Restrictions Off the Register, 195 EcoNoMIsT 267, 268 (1960).
195. E.g., British Radio Valve Manufacturers' Association's Agreement. See note 128
supra.
Any price changes initiated by A.E.I. are at once reflected in the prices of other firms
in the industry in the case of fluorescent tubes. The Financial Times, Sept. 1, 1960.
196. Price Schemes in Lancashire, 195 EcONOMIsT 1364 (1960).
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can commitment to competition as a political ideal.19 7 The public is undoubted-
ly more sensitive to restrictive practices than it used to be ;198 and it has shown
the same aversion to the behavior revealed by the Restrictive Practices Court
that it did to the disclosures of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Com-
mission.' 0  But as a whole it is still not heavily committed to cutting back
restrictive practices.
Moreover, the Government has shown no more than a superficial interest
in continuing the campaign against restrictive practices. When the Restrictive
Practices Court began delivering its opinions, the Government seemed almost
embarrassed by the creature it had brought into being. The Yarn Spinners
decision apparently came as a surprise to the Cabinet, 2° ° which found itself
under fire from the opposition for allowing the judges to decide such impor-
tant questions 201 and from the cotton industry for allowing the Registrar to
bring the case.20 2 When as a result of the decision the price of yarn began to
fall,2 0 3 the government felt compelled to introduce a scheme to rationalize the
cotton industry.204 Furthermore, although the Conservatives denationalized the
iron and steel industry in the name of free enterprise in 1953, they neverthe-
less left in being the Iron and Steel Board 205 which may fix prices in the in-
dustry and performs many of the functions of a regulatory agency. These
activities are specifically exempted from the provisions of the 1956 Act.2 °" It
has even been disclosed that the Government, in the guise of the Post Office,
is a member of some of the notorious market sharing agreements in the tele-
communications equipment industry, and the effect of its membership has been
to cover the agreements with crown privilege, thereby making them nonregis-
trable.20 7
197. For the place of the Sherman Act in American social history, see THORELLI,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST PoLIcY (1954). For a more general summary up to the present
day, see Rostow, British and American Experience with Legislation Against Restraints
of Competition, 23 MODERN L. REv. 477 (1960).
198. In a similar vein, the first attempts have been made to bring consumers together,
Consumers' Association, and to publish magazines analyzing consumer goods, Which?
199. The responsible press has continued its opposition to restrictive practices. E.g.,
Next Question, 196 ECONOMIST 497 (1960) ; Editorial, The Times, February 1, 1961, p. 13,
col. 2.
200. The Guardian, Manchester, January 27, 1959, p. 14, col. 1.
201. See allegation by the former Labour Attorney-General in the House of Commons
that the Government was shirking its responsibility when it "pushes it off on the judges."
The Guardian, Manchester, Jan. 30, 1959, p. 18, col. 2.
202. See letter of Thornton, The Times (London), Jan. 30, 1959, p. 8.
203. Yarn Prices Fall, 190 Ecoxomisr 513 (1959).
204. See Another Scheme for Lancashire, 191 EcoNomisT (1959); A Funeral or
Cure?, 191 EcONOMIST 441 (1959) ; Cotton Industry Act, 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 48.
205. Iron and Steel Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 15; see Steel and Free Enterprise, 164
EcoNoMIsT 296, 298 (1952).
206. The Act, § 7(1).
207. Next Question, 196 EcoNoMIsT 497 (1960). Crown Privilege, inter alia, implies
the presumption that the Crown is not bound by a statute. WADE & PHILLIPs, CoNsTrru-
TIONAL LAw 648 (6th ed., Wade ed. 1960). There is nothing to rebut this presumption in
the 1956 Act.
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Government activity in the field of mergers has been equally disconcerting
and it has shown little interest in maintaining competitive structures for in-
dustries.208 It actually arranged a series of mergers among aircraft manufac-
turers, so that there are today only two major firms.2 0 Some members of the
Cabinet have, admittedly, expressed alarm about the recent rash of mergers,
but they invariably contend that the Monopolies Commission is more than
adequate to handle the situation. 10 This contention is misleading. The Com-
mission cannot act until invited to do so by the Board of Trade, its reports
have never appeared within two years after the date of reference, and whether
it has power to order the dissolution of any merged company into its com-
ponent parts is doubtful. 211 On the whole, then, the Government has appeared
more interested in maintaining good relations with industry than in promot-
ing any serious degree of competition in the country.
That the act has had little impact either on the economy or the mentality
of the business community should not be attributed to the Restrictive Prac-
tices Court. Although the judges of the court have continued to phrase their
judgments in traditional terms, 212 they have acquitted themselves well as arbi-
ters of the public interest. 213 Their analyses of long term public policy, eco-
208. Rees-Mogg, Why the Government Warms to Mergers, The Sunday Times (Lon-
don), Sept. 4, 1960.
209. The Aircraft Mergers, 194 EcONOMIsT 220 (1960).
210. So in the recent Press Merger crisis the Government originally expressed its
confidence that the Commission was fully capable of coping with the situation. Speech of
Mandling, President of Board of Trade, in House of Commons, February 7, 1961, reported
in The Times (London), Feb. 8, 1961, p. 4, col. 7. But this view was apparently abandoned,
and a Royal Commission established to investigate the press. New Royal Commission on
the Press, The Times (London), Feb. 10, 1961, p. 12, cols. 1-2.
211. See note 245 infra.
212. See Chemist's Fed'n, L.R. 1 R.P. 75, 103 (1958) (Devlin, J.):
[W]e have to consider the fundamental question whether it is contrary to the pub-
lic interest that sales of medicines should be effected only through chemists ...
[W]e are not, in our view, in any way required to answer this question as a matter
of policy. We are not to consider whether competition in the sale of medicines is
desirable or undesirable, whether drug stores are a suitable outlet for them or
whether chemists should have a monopoly, or whether the Chemists' Federation is
a good or bad thing. Such questions of general policy are settled by the Act....
Our taskisthe ordinary task of a court of law to" take the words of the Act accord-
ing to their proper construction and see if, upon the facts proved, the case falls with-
in them. "
For an analysis 'f thd cases in traditional ternis; see Lloyd, Symposium on Restrictive
Practices Legislation: .The Lawyer's Point of Vi&'i, 70 Ecox. J. 467 (1960).
213. See-the choice the court made between making 20,000 workmen unemployed, and
having excess capacity reduced in the, cotton industry. Yam Spinners, L.R. 1 R.P. 118, 196
(1959). The judges sitting on the court while talking in traditional terms have also shown
great dexterity in avoiding the traditional approach to interpretation. See especially the
rejection of the argument in English Bakers that the agreement was not registrable be-
cause the trade association had no power to enforce its recommendation. L.R. 1 R.P. 387,
456-57 (1959).
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nomic theories and accounting principles have been impressive. The fears
expressed at the time the act was framed that they would become embroiled
in politics have proved groundless, 214 although their predispositions have occa-
sionally become obvious. 215 Basically they have assumed that the act embodied
a presumption in favor of competition 216 and, with minor exceptions,2 17 have
firmly carried through the presumption.
The more disappointing aspect of the judiciary's work has been in those
areas which the act put in the hands of the ordinary courts, namely registra-
tion,218 resale price maintenance,219 and appeals from the Restrictive Practices
Court on points of law.220 In the cases decided under these provisions, the
214. The fears were expressed in The Times (London), Apr. 11, 1956, p. 11, col. 2,
cited in Speech of Fletcher, 551 H.C. DFB. (5th ser.) 423 (1956).
One of the isolated criticisms of the judges is reported in The Times (London), Jan.
27, 1959, p. 8, cols. 1-2. In discussing the Yarn Spinners decision, Sir Alfred Roberts,
Secretary of the Cardroon Amalgamation said: "It is none of their business. I think it is
deplorable that this comment [more mills closing down] should be made in giving what
one would have regarded as legal judgment."
215. For instance, Diplock, J. appears less wedded to competition than some of his
brethren. See his discussion in Black Bolt and Nut Ass'n, L.R. 2 R.P. 50, 89 (1960) that
price-fixing which saved the buyers from "going shopping" was in the public interest. Note
also his decision in the same case (at 97) that price discriminations in favor of large
buyers were contrary to the public interest.
It is of course possible that the learned judge did not concur in the judgment he read,
see note 121 supra. Some credence is lent to this view by the pro-competitive tone of his
judgment in Motor Vehicles, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 92.
216. Yarn Spinners, L.R. 1 R.P. 118, 189 (1959) (Devlin, J.). See also Scottish
Bakers, L.R. 1 R.P. 347, 376 (1959) (Lord Cameron); Blanket Mfrs., L.R. 1 R.P. 208,
254 (1959) (Upjohn, J.).
217. See Water-Tube Boilermakers, L.R. 1 R.P. 285 (1959); Black Bolt and Nut,
L.R. 1 R.P. 50 (1960).
218. The only registration point argued out in front of the high court was particularly
unsatisfactory. In Austin Motor Co., L.R. 1 R.P. 6 (Ch. 1957), Upjohn, J. refused to de-
clare registrable a list of bipartite supply contracts which had been drafted to replace a
series of registrable tripartite restrictive trading agreements. The learned judge noted,
"While every agreement must be read in the light of surrounding circumstances, those
circumstances cannot be invoked to alter the true interpretation of a document, or two or
more documents, whose operation is clear and unambiguous." Id. at 19. By defining these
agreements as supply contracts, the judge found he was able to avoid deciding whether the
new activities amounted to an arrangement.
219. The high court is charged with hearing cases under section twenty-five of the
Act, whereby a supplier may enforce his resale price against a retailer taking with notice.
Even here they have managed to preserve the traditional judicial approach to statutory
interpretation, so that there has been considerable lifigation concerning the meaning of
"notice." See County Labs., Ltd. v. J. Mihidel, Ltd., L.R. " -R.P. 1. (Ch. 1957) ; Goodyear
Tyre & Rubber Co. (Great Britain) v. Lancashire" Batteries, Ltd., L:R. 1 RiP. 22 (Ch.
& C.A. 1958); Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Longlife Battery Depot, L.R. 1 R.P. 65 (Ch.
1958). See generally Korah, Resale Price Maintenance and the Restrictive Trade Practices
Act, 1956, 24 MoD. L. Rnv. 219 (1961).
220. In the only appeal taken from the Restrictive Practices Court, the Court of Appeal
refused to declare registrable an agreement between blanket manufacturers that none of
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judges have apparently felt inhibited by the traditional approach, and have
given legalistic decisions, some of which have hampered the overall effective-
ness of the act.
THE FUTURE OF THE 1956 ACT
The Restrictive Trade Practices Act has almost completed its task. All the
major types of registered practices have now been tested to determine whether
they are in the public interest, and within a few months there will probably
be only a handful of active agreements left on the Register.
The only circumstances in which the court might have further important
functions to fulfill would be if the Registrar were to adopt a stronger policy
towards registration. A beginning has been made in tracking down unregis-
tered agreements, 221 and this might well be accelerated. Another step in this
direction would be the bringing of a test case designed to overrule the Austin
decision.222 Just as pressing is the need to test what has been going on behind
the facade of some trade associations 223 and many open-price agreements.2 24
There is also room for a more vigorous use of the Monopolies Commission
which, although its powers are still considerable, has been left with practically
no work since 1956. The existence of a Register of Restrictive Agreements
and a court to investigate them has overshadowed the restrictionism in in-
them would agree to the breaking of a contract of supply, without consulting their trade
association. Although the object of the resolution was to stop price cutting, the Court of
Appeal approached it solely as a question of interpretation. Finding that section six called
only for the registration of agreements concerning restrictions to be applied, they deduced
that this limited its application to cases where parties were about to enter a contract and
did not cover restrictions affecting rights and obligations under a completed contract. Blan-
ket Mfrs., L.R. 1 R.P. 271 (C.A. 1959) ; see Ison, Restrictive Trade Practices-The Danger
Sign, 23 MODERN L. REV. 202 (1960).
221. Some 250 agreements have been registered after an inquiry from the Registrar.
See Report of the Registrar (1961), 6.
222. See note 218 supra.
While this case stands it is impossible to believe that the courts would require regis-
tration of unenforceable or gentlemen's agreements. But the act was intended to achieve
just that. See Speech of Thorneycroft, 549 H.C. DEE. (5th ser.) 2097 (1956). The Ameri-
can court presented with a similar situation would almost certainly have found a registrable
tripartite arrangement. In addition, in such circumstances it might have found an implied
agreement to fix prices horizontally either among wholesalers or retailers. See Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911). There are some precedents
which might persuade an English court to adopt this latter solution. See Clarke v. Dun-
raven, [1897] A.C. 59.
223. See notes 188-91 supra. Note Johnson-Davies, Trade Associations and the Re-
strictive Practices Act, 3 BRiT. J. AD. L. 12 (1956) for an analysis of how far Trade
Associations may go under the 1956 Act without requiring its activities to be registered.
224. See notes 192-96 supra; cf. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377 (1921) ; United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923) (Ameri-
can precedents). The analysis of some of the "open price agreements" would seem to show
they are similar to the arrangements condemned in these cases, and go further than the
behavior allowed in Maple Flooring Mfrs.' Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
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dustries controlled by monopolies or oligopolies, where competition may easily
be avoided without resort to agreements. It is illogical, however, to concen-
trate all efforts on discouraging obvious anticompetitive behavior in industries
which have many small producers, when those which are run by large firms
are allowed to choose their own pattern of competition. If the procedure of
the Commission were to be streamlined, it might well prove an effective com-
panion to the Restrictive Practices Court.
FURTHER LEGISLATION
Increased attention to registration and to the Monopolies Commission would
only be of temporary importance. If the work begun in 1956 is to be carried
to its logical conclusion, more legislation will be necessary. The strength of
such legislation will depend largely on the attitude of influential public opinion
towards restrictive practices. As has already been seen, the 1956 Act in no
way represented the wholehearted belief in competition which the American
antitrust laws are alleged to represent. Indeed, each of the enumerated gate-
ways reflects a conscious effort to temper the commitment to competition
which the authors of the bill claimed for it.
There is now, however, sufficient interest in seeing British industry become
more dynamic for it to be no longer naive to believe that further legislation may
be passed.225 The liberal elements in the Conservative Party have come to
realize that if the market is not to be allowed to be the arbiter of price, then
the arguments in favor of state planning or outright nationalization are in-
finitely stronger. Some such feeling was afoot in 1956, when the Government
spokesmen claimed that the Cabinet was wedded to the free enterprise so-
ciety.2 26 But even if the present Government does not act to strengthen the
monopolies and restrictive practices legislation, support for such a move may
not be lacking, for recent Fabian writings have suggested that the Labour
Party should come out in favor of a strong antitrust law.227
Agreements Between Competitors
The 1956 Act should be amended to require every trade association and
similar organization which distributes trade statistics to register its constitu-
tion or articles together with a description of its activities. No doubt many
of these would be found to be in no way contrary to the public interest, and
225. For recent surveys of the competitive nature of British Industry see Burn, Retro-
spect, in 2 THE STRUCTURE OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 415 (Burn ed. 1958) ; FRANKEL, BRITISH
AND AMERICAN MANUFACTURING PRODUCTIVITY 75, 116 (1957).
The lack of competitive bidding has already done great harm to the export trade which
is so vital to the British economy. See MIDDLETON, THESE ARE THE BRITISH 199 (1957).
226. See Speech of Thorneycroft, 549 H.C. DEB. (5th ser.) (1956) ; Speech of Kilmuir,
198 H.L. DEB. (5th ser.) 21 (1956).
227. HUTBER, WANTED-A MONOPOLY POLICY (Fabian Society Research series, No,
19, 1960).
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others to do a great deal of unobjectionable work. Such a change however,
would give the court an admirable opportunity to survey the very core of the
competitive structure of British industry. Moreover, as the High Court has
shown itself reluctant to adopt any but a traditional approach to the deter-
mination of points of registration, such questions should be transferred to the
Restrictive Practices Court.
Other activities which discourage competition between firms in the same
industry are also in need of legislative remedy. In the United States, if a
company chooses to trade in different corporate forms, the antitrust laws may
require the different members to maintain an element of active competition.228
The English law goes to the other extreme. Not only does it exempt from reg-
istration agreements between related companies from registration, 22 but by
its definition of "interrelated bodies corporate" it allows the establishment of
a company which may be the subsidiary of two other corporations. Hence any
two companies which have a registrable restrictive agreement, but for some
reason have no wish to see it appear on the Register, may avoid the necessity
of publicity by establishing a joint subsidiary.
Another glaring omission from the present British legislation is the ab-
sence of any provision equivalent to section eight of the Clayton Act,2 0 al-
though the practice of interlocking directorates is very common in the United
Kingdom. Through the five major commercial banks, many leading industrial
concerns are related; and frequently several firms in the same industry will
have common directors. 22 ' It has been calculated, for instance, that when the
steel industry was nationalized in 1951 all its major firms were linked through
the board of the Westminster Bank. 2
Finally, there seems to be little rationality in limiting the operation of the
requirement of registration to agreements relating to goods. The American
antitrust laws have found no serious difficulty in adapting themselves to the
problem of agreements relating to services. 233 No doubt the real objection
which the government felt in 1956 to making any such extension was that it
might encompass the activities of trade unions, but it should not be impossible
to draft legislation designed to secure the registration of restrictive agreements
in services provided by business, while excluding workmen's agreements.
228. ATr'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 33 (1955).
229. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, § 8(9).
230. ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 116 (1955).
231. Sandelson, The Confidence Trick, in THE ESTABLISHMENT 129 (Thomas ed.
1959).
232. AARONOVITCH, MONOPOLY, A STUDY OF BRITISH MONOPOLY COMPETITION 32
(1955).
233. See, e.g., Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1953)
(banking); United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (investment
banking); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (news); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (advertising); United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898) (railhway services); Radovich v. National Foot-
ball League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (professional football).
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Resale Price Maintenance
The American case of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons,
decided in 1911, held that individual resale price maintenance could amount
to a conspiracy in restraint of trade, and was therefore illegal under both the
Sherman Act and the common law. 34 Legislation to establish this rule was
contemplated by the Labour Government in 1951, but the idea was shelved by
the Conservatives when they regained power. In 1956, as a quid pro quo for
accepting the establishment of the new court, industry obtained section twenty-
five, which gave manufacturers the power to enforce the prices of all their
goods, branded or not, against retailers who took with notice.2 5 In some in-
dustries, particularly those which involve an oligopoly, this section has meant
that the overall effect of the act has been anticompetitive,2 6 and great possi-
bilities for misuse of the provision exist.2 7 There has therefore been strong
pressure, with which the Labour Party is associated, 8 for the repeal of the
provision. The Council on Prices, Productivity and Income has asked for the
situation to be reviewed ;239 and the responsible press has joined in this de-
mand.240 The President of the Board of Trade has now appointed a commit-
tee to analyze the desirability of repealing the section, 241 and it seems at least
possible that a bill will soon be introduced to outlaw fair trade,242 or to oblige
each firm to justify its policy before the Restrictive Practices Court.
234. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Even an individual refusal to deal, used to enforce a fair
trade scheme, is fraught with danger. United States v. Parke-Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960). In fact, Congress has passed laws, Miller-Tydings Resale Price Maintenance Act,
50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958) ; McGuire Amendment, 66 Stat. 631 (1952),
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1958), to enable the States to pass fair trade laws for their own jurisdic-
tion. The majority have done so, and in such states the position of individual resale price
maintenance is normally very similar to English Law under the Act. All forms of collective
price fixing, however, remain illegal.
235. More Competition or Less?, 186 EcoNoi sT 683 (1958) ; The Commission and
the Court, 186 EcoNoMIsT 777 (1958).
236. See, e.g., Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission, Report on the Supply
and Export of Pneumatic Tyres, f 497 (1955) where it was recommended that all resale
price maintenance be declared illegal in that industry. In fact the tyre industry has made
full use of § 25 since 1956. See, e.g., Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Lancashire Batteries
Ltd., L.R. 1 R.P. 22 (C.A. 1958); Dunlop Rubber Co. v. Longlife Battery Depot, L.R. 1
R.P. 65 (Ch. 1958).
237. The wording of § 25 allows an injunction to cover all goods traded in by the
bupplier. Thus an injunction brought by a conglomerate monopoly might have a pro-
nounced effect on the retailing activities of a trader in all areas. For the alarming diversity
of some conglomerate enterprises in England, see description of the Beecham Group in
AARONOVITCH, MONOPOLY 9 (1955).
238. See Interview with Gaitskell, The Director, Apr., 1959.
239. Council on Prices, Productivity and Income, First Report, 48 (1958).
240. The campaign in the press was most marked at the end of 1959 and the beginning
of 1960. See The Times (London), Dec. 28, 1959, p. 7; Resolutions for the Chancellor,
194 EcoNOMIST 9 (1960); Cut-Price Competition, 194 EcoNomIST 289 (1960).
241. Statement by President of the Board of Trade, March 17, 1960.
242. Is it Goodbye to Fixed Prices in the Shops?, Sunday Times (London), Sept. 4,
1960.
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The Structure of Industry
If English law is to take a balanced approach to stimulating competition,
then much more attention will have to be paid to the size of firms in any one
industry.243 The 1956 legislation was brought into being without enough
thought being given to the problems of competition in industries where an
oligopoly or monopoly situation made the registration and investigation proc-
ess meaningless. Under the 1948 Act it was possible to examine oligopolies
or monopolies, and this power is still vested in the reconstructed Monopolies
Commission; but as has already been seen the Commission has been largely
neglected since 1956. Even if it were activated it would need new legislation
to make its recommendations more effective. This could be done by giving
them the force of judicial decisions. The functions of the Commission might
even be transferred to the Restrictive Practices Court whose ability to handle
such questions is already proved. In this way the political pressures intended
to persuade the Government not to accept the recommendations of the
Commission, which have sometimes been successful in the past, would be
avoided.2 44 Nor would it be unreasonable to give the body charged with this
jurisdiction the powers of divorcement and dissolution, which are at present
unavailable, 245 for they may provide the only effective method of restoring
competition in a monopoly situation.m2 46
Similarly, little thought was given in 1956 to the effect of mergers. Op-
position M.P.'s, 247 and some industrial leaders 248 pointed out that mergers
might actually be encouraged by the registration provision in the act, but the
243. Until recently, little research had been done on the structure of British Industry.
In the last few years, much has been done to remedy this. See, e.g., EVELY & LITTLE,
CONCENTRATION IN BRITISH INDUSTRY (1960) ; Hart, Business Concentration in the United
Kingdom, 123 JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL STATISTICAL SOCIETY 50 (1960).
244. Under existing legislation, Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and
Control) Act, 1948, § 10, the Board of Trade or other "competent authority" has the power
to accept or reject recommendations of the Commission. Thus, for instance, recommenda-
tions concerning aggregated rebates in Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission,
Report on the Supply of Electric Lamps, paras. 292-93 (1951) were not accepted by the
Government. See The Times (London), May 20, 1952, p. 6; BOARD OF TRADE: MONOPOLIES
AND RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1952).
245. In Cairns, Monopolies and Restrictive Practices, LAw AND OPINION IN ENo-
LAND IN THE 20Tn CENTURY (Ginsberg ed. 1959) it is suggested at 183 that dissolution
can be recommended by the Commission. But, even if this were done it would seem that
the "competent authority" would have no legal power to implement it. See Monopolies
and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, § 10, 1948.
246. American courts have the power of divestiture after a violation of either § 1 or
§ 2 of the Sherman Act or § 7 of the Clayton Act. In fact it has been used sparingly. See
ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 355 (1955).
247. Speech of Jay, 549 H.C. DEa. (5th ser.) (1956) ; Speech of Padley, 549 H.C.
DEB. (5th ser.) 1908 (1956). See also the Amendment at the Committee Stage, 551 H.C.
DEB. (5th ser.) 2105 (1956).
248. E.g., Lord Chandos, Chairman of A,E.I., cited in Court Report, 191 EcoNoMIsT
3$5 (1959),
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Government apparently took the traditional English view that amalgamations
only took place because of economies of scale.249 That this is sometimes true
cannot be doubted ;250o indeed many British industries are overburdened with
too many small firms251 which have been kept in being by the use of restric-
tive practices. But it is also true that many mergers have taken place without
effecting economies of scale in production,2 52 and have only resulted in elimi-
nating competition.2 5 3 Moreover, parties to restrictive agreements have often
chosen to resort to mergers rather than face the prospect of competition when
their agreement has been threatened with being held against the public inter-
est.25 4 The need for remedial legislation here is urgent; and no better prece-
dent could be found than section seven of the Clayton Act.2 55
Enforcement
It may be desirable to set up an entirely independent enforcement agency
to deal with both monopolies and restrictive practices. At the moment the
Board of Trade is responsible for referring industries to the Monopolies Com-
249. E.g., Kilroy, Tasks and Methods of the Monopolies Commission, 22 MANCHESTER
SCHOOL 37 (1953). In conjunction with this the view is frequently advanced that the
English market may be smaller and there may be room for only one firm large enough to
exploit the economies of scale. For a persuasive rejection of this view see FRANKEL,
BRITISH AND AMERICAN MANUFACTURING PRODUCTIVITY 69, 80 (1957). Only in one of
the industries examined by the Monopolies Commission was the largest producer found to
have the lowest costs. Jewkes, supra note 73, at 18.
250. For a useful analysis of the reasons leading to mergers, see Comment, 68 YALE
L.J. 1627 (1959).
251. See BOWEN, BRITAIN'S INDUSTRIAL SURVIVAL 89 (1947); D.S.I.R., REPORT ON
THE SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY (1960) (specific example).
252. E.g., When Austin and Nuffield merged into the British Motor Corporation, to
control half the output of motor cars, the two divisions continued to operate as independent
companies. The retention of premerger corporate structures is a frequent aspect of mergers
in the United Kingdom. See, for instance, the reports of projected mergers in the radio
and tobacco industries. The Times (London), Oct. 29, 1960, p. 6.
253. E.g., Courtaulds and British Celanese amalgamated in 1957 to give them 85%
of the rayon industry. See Jewkes, British Monopoly Policy 1944-56, 1 J. OF LAW AND
ECON. 1, 14 (1958).
The final outcome of the Daily Herald take-over battle, described note 210 supra, was
a victory for Mr. King of the Daily Mirror. He said the main objective of his bid was to
"eliminate the more absurd forms of cut-throat competition in a field where it must be
evident there is ample scope for real economies." Press Chain Sale in London Likely, The
New York Times, Feb. 25, 1961, p. 2, col. 4.
254. The most notorious examples are Cables, see MOON, BUSINESS MERGERS AND
TAKE OVER BIDS 20 (1959), and Copper, Mounting Criticism of the Restrictive Practices
Act, The Times (London), Apr. 29, 1959, p. 20.
The movement has, however, been much broader than that. See Manchester Guardian
Review of Industry, Mar. 1958; Court Report, 191 EcoNomisT 355 (1959) ; Impact of the
Restrictive Practices Court, The Times (London), Aug. 30, 1960; Mergers in 1960, 197
ECONOMIST 1417 (1960).
255. See How Big is Wrong?, 198 EcoNomiST 579 (1961). For the working of the
"new" § 7, see note 250 supra.
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mission, for initiating investigations into the success of earlier undertakings
by industry to reform, and for general supervision of the Department of the
Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements. The Monopolies Commission
has wide primary and secondary investigating power, but it is powerless to
move without the consent of the Board of Trade. The Registrar is responsible
for supervising registration, preparing cases before the court, and seeing that
undertakings given to the court are adhered to. He may now also be required
to keep watch on the behavior of industries whose restrictive agreements are
found not to be contrary to the public interest.256 While there is no evidence
that this three-fold division is working badly, a unified command, severed
from the Board of Trade, has much to commend it. Particularly beneficial
would be the opportunity to develop a departmental attitude different from
the normal civil service reluctance to curb the activities of industry.25 7
To the American reader many of these recommendations must appear to be
a logical necessity. This is far less obvious to the average English observer.
But with the growing demand in England for greater competition in industry,
the similarity of the two economies may well make the American solutions the
guide to further English legislation.m 8
EpILoGUE
Although the influence of the 1956 Act has not been as pronounced as its
authors had hoped, the principle has nevertheless been established that even
in England legal sanctions may be used to stimulate competition. There should
now be less objection to giving judges the power to adjudicate other problems
of a politico-economic nature. If control of the trade practices of corporations
is entrusted to the judiciary it is arguable that the judiciary should be put in
the same position with regard to the Trade Unions which at the moment are
256. [1960] 1 W.L.R. 884. The price agreement in that case was held to be in the
public interest, because, inter alia, the prices were reasonable, but the Court said if the
prices fixed by the Association were ever to become unreasonable, then the Registrar would
be entitled to reopen the case (at 909). This seems to put a greater burden of supervision
on the Registrar's Department than was intended by the act.
For other policing problems, see Yarn Spinners, L.R. 2 R.P. 103 (1960). Allowing a
restriction of little economic importance, after the parties earlier agreements have been
struck down. The same questions are raised by the power of the Board of Trade, on the
recommendation of the Registrar, to strike an agreement of no economic significance from
the Register. See Report of the Registrar (1961), para. 35, Appendix B.
257. Although the antitrust division of the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission present a divided approach to antitrust enforcement, there is no doubt
their attitude to businessmen is very different from the Department of Commerce. The
British Act leaves basic enforcement to the Board of Trade, the equivalent of the Depart-
ment of Commerce. On the attitude of the Board of Trade towards industry, see note 89
supra.
258. For a contrast betveen the factors leading to differing types of pro-competitive
legislation, see FREIDIANN, A CO-mPARATmV AxALYsis IN ANTI-TRusT LAws 519 (Freid-
mann ed. 1956).
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almost outside the law ;250 and there is already political support for such a
move.
2@0
But the precedent of the Restrictive Practices Court may project itself even
beyond judicial supervision of matters relating to the economy. The English
legal tradition has been hostile to the -development of administrative law. 261
It has been assumed that the responsible system of government made active
judicial supervision of the executive superfluous.2 62 But in recent years there
has been a growing disillusion with the ability of Parliament to supervise the
Executive. 2 3 One view favors adopting the Scandinavian Ombudsman-an
independent public official to whom complaints about executive behavior might
be addressed. 264 But it is equally arguable that the courts might be invited
back into these areas, which were previously thought of as exclusively political,
now that it has been shown that English judges are not incapable of handling
such problems.26 5
Indeed, it is even possible that a new spirit is afoot in the whole legal at-
titude in England. The narrow concept 266 of the role of law, lawyers, and
the judiciary may be passing. Viscount Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor, has ex-
pressed this new spirit:
The law is not to be compared to a veritable antique to be taken down,
dusted, admired and put back on the shelf; rather it is like an old but
still vigorous tree-firmly rooted in history; but still putting out new
shoots, taking nev grafts and from time to time dropping dead wood.
That process has been going on, is going on now and will continue.
After all, law is not an end in itself. It is a means whereby the State
can develop and regulate in an orderly and just manner the social sys-
tem which it desires. It follows that, as the social problems of the day
are constantly changing, the law must adapt itself to meet them.26T
Lawyers in the early years in the United States claimed they had inherited
the spirit of the common law. But they did more than inherit it; they pro-
259. The Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47.
260. THE INNS OF COURT CONSERVATION AND UNIONIST Soc'Y, A GIANT'S STRENGTH
ch. 6 (1958).
261. See DE SzinTH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIoN ch. 1 (1959).
262. E.g., DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
328 (10th ed. 1959).
263. Steet, Administrative Law, in 1960 CONFERENCE OF BRITISH, CANADIAN AND
AMERICAN LAW TEACHERS 2.
264. Blom-Cooper, An Ombudsman in Britain?, [1960] PUBLIC LAW 145.
265. See Davis, The Future of Judge-Made Public Law in England: A Problem of
'ractical Jurisprudence, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 201 (1961).
266. For a contrast between the English and American attitudes, see Goodhart, The
New York Court of Appeals and the House of Lords, in GooDHART, ESSAYS IN JIulS-
PRUDENCE AND THE CoMMON LAW 268, 280 (1931): Gower & Price, The Profession and
Practice of the Law in England, 20 MODERN L. REV. 317 (1957) ; Legal Lights, 196 EcoN-
OmIST 806 (1960).
267. Kilmuir, The State, The Citizen and The Law, 73 L.Q. REv. 172, 173 (1957).
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tected it from the passive attitude which it took on in England, and they
adapted it to serve the society of a modern country. It now seems that some
of the spirit of the American common law is to be used to regenerate its aging
relative.268
268. For another appeal for a more dynamic approach on the part of the English
judges, see Lawson, The Academic Lawyer as Jurist, 5 THE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY OF
PunLIc TEACHERS OF LAW 182 (1960).
